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ABSTRACT 
______________________________________________________ 
Procedural rules governing judicial proceedings at the European Union (EU) 
judiciary help organize how access to justice takes place. These rules cover a 
broad spectrum ranging from how the various EU Courts are organized (i.e. 
their composition, their deliberation procedures and rules about the use of 
languages, to the rights and obligations of lawyers, the methods of service and 
time-limits), plus a myriad of other rules governing the written and oral phases 
of a variety of legal remedies, each with their own specificities and stumbling 
blocks. 
Insiders tend to see these rules as a necessary evil, while many others perceive 
them as a particularly remote, arid, and boring facet of what must appear to all 
as an ocean - if not an abyss - of legislative rules determining much more of 
our daily professional and private lives than we could possibly be aware of.  
This context statement seeks not only to rectify such impressions, but to 
critically identify a number of non-legal aspects of my profoundly legal 
activity as a litigator and author of an article-by-article Commentary and other 
public works on the rules of procedure of the EU judiciary in Luxembourg.  
This critique explores the major influence that my professional career as an 
external counsel to many EU institutions and agencies has had upon both my 
public works and my successful legal practice. It reflects on how acquiring a 
particular approach to this work provided substantial motivation for my 
professional life. I elaborate on applying this reflection to my professional 
practice, which has included pleading over 350 cases at the EU Courts as well 
publishing various works on EU law.  
I have given more attention than anticipated to the importance of learning 
foreign languages - a professional key to other cultures above and beyond other 
requirements for being a litigator at the EU courts. I have also reflected more 
than expected on the benefits of lifelong learning.  
One core theme is the cross-fertilization of litigation and the publishing of legal 
articles. This has become a professional learning opportunity through a critical 
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assessment of my published work in addition to an analysis of that work’s 
reviews. I explore (1) aspects of my major work, the Commentary, which need 
to be improved; (2) themes in my work which I have hitherto addressed from 
an exclusively legal point of view but which lend themselves to being enriched 
by ideas drawn from other disciplines; and (3) a number of conclusions, both 
for the present and the future, which I did not expect to reach when I started 
out on writing this critique of my own works.  
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INTRODUCTION 
______________________________________________________ 
Today, many in the general public have contradicting views about “the EU”, to 
say the least. For decades, there was awareness and appreciation of the 
European integration’s unique achievements, which range from the creation of 
a community of peace and common values, to the liberalization of economic 
freedoms such as trade by abolishing tariffs and protectionist national 
restrictions.  
 
But over time, this post-war perception has been increasingly diluted if not 
blurred by the Communities’ gradual metamorphosis into a political union. 
This evolution to what is now known as the “European Union,” which even a 
number of experts and outspoken friends of Europe perceive as akin to an ever 
faster journey to an unknown destination, has contributed to perceiving the EU 
as a galaxy of its own, which generates the impression of being both more and 
more distant and intrusive at the same time.  
 
As for the EU judiciary in Luxembourg, it seems to intend to remain largely 
unknown by the public, only drawing the particular attention of the media 
whenever a controversial judgment is handed down. The EU judiciary then 
gently disappears from the radar again, into its shadowy existence, where it is 
always at some risk of being mixed up with the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg.  
 
Not so many are aware that the EU has three judicial instances, i.e. the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), which was created in 1952, the General Court 
(GC), which was added in 1988, and the Civil Service Tribunal of the EU 
(CST), created in 2005 in order to lower the GC’s workload. That said, it is 
only normal that relatively few have any particular knowledge of or interest in 
such a niche area as the rules of procedure of the EU judicial instances. This is 
primarily a matter for those either actively or likely to be involved in the 
procedures themselves. These are not numerous: for example, in 2013, a total 
of 691 proceedings were lodged at the ECJ, 722 at the GC and 127 at the CST.  
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That said, in the midst of all these mixed feelings and contrasting views no one 
should lose sight of the fact that quite a number of ECJ judgments concern the 
interpretation of aspects of substantive EU law which are relevant well beyond 
the parties involved in the proceedings, often affecting many, if not all, of us. 
For instance, the ECJ clarified the rules on the right of third-country nationals 
who are family members of an EU citizen to reside in the Member State of 
origin of that citizen
1
. The ECJ finding that a Spanish law requiring airlines to 
carry checked-in baggage without a surcharge infringes EU law is likely to be 
bad news for millions of tourists
2
. And most likely everybody within the Union 
is concerned with the ECJ upholding that an internet search engine operator is 
responsible for the processing that it carries out of personal data which appear 
on web pages published by third parties, meaning that every citizen enjoys the 
right “to be forgotten” and may, in principle, request operators of search 
machines to remove personal information
3
.  
 
These and many other judgments result from parties to these cases having 
complied with all relevant rules of procedure and being aware that even the 
most brilliant substantive arguments are very much at risk of becoming 
worthless if their author misinterprets or otherwise ignores vital procedural 
rules. This is one of a number of reasons why I decided to write an article-by-
article Commentary about the subject of EU procedural law. As the name 
indicates, the sequence of provisions in the various sets of procedural laws 
structures the contents of this Commentary. This is different than a monograph, 
which is structured according to subjects. My Commentary, which was 
published in 2013, is the first of its kind. 
 
I have therefore chosen to center my context statement on this Commentary 
and to critique my work from several different angles. These include 
reflections on my professional life which has confirmed two important points 
for me: why I enjoy my professional role, and why I see my main public work, 
                                                          
1
 Joined Cases C-456/12 and C-457/12, O and B v Minister voor Immigratie [2014] 
2
 Case C-487/12, Vueling Airlines [2014] 
3
 Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google [2014] 
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the Commentary, as contributing to cultural exchange and accessibility through 
increasing the transparency of procedures in the European Courts as well as to 
improving my own professional practice. 
 
The following is a summary of each section. 
 
Section 1  
- Contextualizing my role:  
(i) my professional role as a litigation lawyer at the EU courts, with a long 
track record of cases pleaded and legal articles published; followed by a 
description of the many coincidences which led me to choose a career as a 
lawyer specializing in EU law; the fundamental impact of a particular approach 
on my professional life. 
  (ii) important personal prerequisites of success as an EU litigator, e.g. the idea 
that learning foreign languages is not merely a linguistic exercise, but a key 
aspect of accessing the richness other cultures offer by the rewarding activity 
of writing legal articles and publications.  
 
Section 2  
- Contextualizes the importance of the procedural rules of the EU judiciary, 
describes the difference between an article-by-article Commentary and a 
monograph, defends my choice of a commentary in relation to target audiences; 
and lists the learning opportunities which arise from “going public”. 
 
Section 3  
- (i) This is the core of the context statement, a critical reflection on the 
Commentary as my main work, including an assessment of whether my book is 
a major work. This assessment at first appeared to present a conflict of interest 
and thus became a quest for objective metrics to assess the Commentary’s 
quality. This resulted in an in depth analysis of the research and development 
methodology which I deemed appropriate to the Commentary.  
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(ii) A critical exploration of eight new subjects which the Commentary either 
does not address or only marginally addresses. These arose through outside 
reviews and being able to stand back and reflect on the work at a distance. 
 
Section 4  
- Identifies main reviews of the Commentary, treating them as an opportunity to 
review ideas or critiques leading to new ideas, and implement them in the 
future.  
 
Section 5 
- Addresses issues I did not expect to arise when writing my context statement. 
This involves reflections on a multitude of questions e.g. whether professional 
success is the result of auto-determined decisions or something predetermined, 
whether there are remedies against the risk of acquiring a “tunnel-view” in my 
profession. This section concludes with a statement of my understanding of 
professional leadership in the context of publishing.  
 
Section 6  
- Reflects on future publishing and teaching projects driven and informed by 
what has emerged out of this critical engagement with my public works.  
 
Section 7 
- Summarizes the main reflections and findings of this context statement.  
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
______________________________________________________ 
ATILO Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor 
Organization (Geneva)  
 
CEOS  Conditions of Employment of Other Servants 
 
CFI  Court of First Instance of the EU (Luxembourg) 
CST   Civil Service Tribunal of the EU (Luxembourg)  
ECHR  European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg)  
ECJ   European Court of Justice of the EU (Luxembourg)  
ECLI   European Case Law Identifier  
ECR   European Court Report  
EU   European Union  
GC   General Court of the EU, (Luxembourg) 
GDP   Gross domestic product   
ICJ    International Court of Justice (The Hague)  
ILO   International Labor Organization  
MEP   Member of the European Parliament  
NGO   Non-governmental organization  
RP   Rules of procedure  
TEU   Treaty on the EU  
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the EU  
UN   United Nations  
 
 
11 
 
SECTION 1 
Personal and professional positioning in context 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Lawyer in EU Law  
In 1990, I became a lawyer in a Brussels-based “boutique” law firm and later 
joined Alber & Geiger, a Berlin-based law firm with branch offices in Brussels 
and London. I am head of the EU law department in Brussels. I mostly practice 
as a litigator before the EU courts in Luxembourg, i.e. the ECJ, the GC and the 
CST, where I have pleaded some 330 cases and a further 30 cases at the 
Administrative Tribunal of the ILO in Geneva (see Appendix 1)
4
.  
 
It is mainly because of the small size and geographical location of my previous 
law firm, and my proficiency in several languages, that I have become an 
external litigation counsel to a large number of EU institutions and Agencies.  
 
In parallel, I have published numerous articles in high-level legal journals and, 
more recently, two books on the procedural rules before the EU Courts, 
including the Commentary that forms the object of the present context 
statement (see Appendix 2).  
 
Litigation in EU law – a lesson of humility  
My professional activity has taught me that becoming and remaining a 
professional in EU law requires mastering challenges that go beyond that of 
most other legal professions:  
Firstly, working as an external counsel to EU institutions requires much more 
than technical work on factual and legal issues plus the quality and 
trustworthiness expected from any lawyer. One needs to (1) meet the high 
professional and linguistic expectations of EU public servants who are 
                                                          
4
 In its 2002/2003 edition, the German handbook on law firms “JUVE” mentioned me as one of 
the 10 leading German names in EU litigation. 
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recruited through a particularly demanding selection procedure; (2) be able to 
interact with people from different cultures and backgrounds; and (3) be truly 
trustworthy - at all times - rather than be content with conveying “a sense” of 
trustworthiness.  
Secondly, legal advice and litigation in EU law is about finding the right blend 
of factual, legal, strategic, and sometimes political arguments, which are then 
assessed by others, in two steps. The first hurdle is getting the approval of the 
client, who is almost always a member of an institution’s legal service and thus 
often a high level expert. The subsequent challenge is at the oral hearing, 
which takes place in front of judges who are equally highly qualified. 
Thirdly, pleading before an EU judicial instance comprised of judges from 
different Member States requires more than speaking and understanding 
several languages. It also requires communicating with EU judges from 
sometimes very different cultural backgrounds. This requires carefully 
choosing one’s words and acquiring a certain restraint or awareness that the 
tone and content of what is said may generate different mental pictures and 
culturally determined reactions in those who listen. 
Finally, an additional - more personal - challenge is about being ready for a 
lifelong learning process. By this I do not mean the obligation of continuing 
professional development, which applies to many other professions. Instead, 
the concept of lifelong learning is based on the belief that the present is a 
“period of intense structural and destabilizing change” to which there needs to 
be a response (Edwards, Ranson, Strain, 2002: 525). Thus, lifelong learning, a 
subject taken up by the European Commission (Hake, 1999), becomes a tool 
for e.g. enhancing employability (McKenzie, Wurzburg, 1997) and reducing 
social exclusion (Stenfors-Hayes, Griffiths, Ogunleye, 2008). But as with 
almost any concept, it is also criticized, e.g. by Coffield, 1999 and Crowther, 
2004, who see the “learning society” as another form of social control.  
This concept is important for my professional life because it helps me to stay 
open-minded and receptive to new challenges, which in turn tends to prevent 
mediocrity and a particular mental rigidity. This not only potentially benefits 
the quality of legal arguments in my professional life, but also helps me to keep 
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my feet on the ground. As much as professional success is an obvious source of 
personal satisfaction to me, I am aware that there is always the potential for 
this reducing the level of professionalism any successful career requires, - a 
particular risk for those who are self-employed. Being too impressed by one’s 
own successes provides a fertile soil for complacency, becoming negligent, or 
turning arrogant. In the end, some lawyers even manage to become their own 
caricature, which some might see as helping them in remaining self-confident, 
while it may actually be a tangible symptom of a lack of confidence.  
From my experience, those who are truly successful in their life tend to be both 
remarkably “normal” in the way they behave and will often have not only a 
reservoir of considerable knowledge outside their field but an attitude of 
openness and curiosity which not only expands but challenges their technical 
expertise on a regular basis. 
Upbringing  
I was born to a French mother and a German father who were eager not only to 
give me a bilingual education, but also to provide me with equal access to and 
awareness of both cultures. When my family moved to Brussels for 
professional reasons, this new environment, which happens to be a crossing 
point between the Germanic and Latin cultures, was one that facilitated both of 
my cultural backgrounds to co-exist and the learning of further languages.  
Over the years, this helped me to become increasingly aware of how enriching 
and indeed unique Europe’s wide variety of coexisting cultures and mentalities 
is, and how much progress has been made in this part of the world since the 
days when “hereditary enemies” recurrently fought each other - at substantial 
human cost in lives and knowledge exchange. 
I also gradually realized that no matter what I would do in life I would seek to 
remain in a multi-cultural environment. A posteriori, I see my career choice as 
being more pragmatic than idealistic since it released me from having to ever 
integrate into a purely national context, a potentially cumbersome challenge 
after so many years spent in a context where many cultures meet. By the same 
token, it helped me to appreciate the various national identities coexisting in 
Europe. I also feared that this would force me to decide whether I was more 
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German than French or vice-versa, which would force me to somehow lose my 
cross-cultural identity. Such reflections informed my conclusion that I needed 
to shape my future higher education and profession around these factors. But 
the road is rarely that straight and, in looking back, I am grateful it was not.  
Enrolling in economics at the University of Bonn at the beginning of my 
university studies quickly proved to be the ‘wrong’ choice, but led me to 
discover law, to which I switched in Bonn. Perhaps something is only a 
‘wrong’ choice if we do not learn from it and act on that learning.  
I enjoyed studying law, but during the early eighties, the international arms 
race and the prospect of a Soviet westbound expansion made the future look 
rather uncertain. I began reflecting on whether I should emigrate, for example 
to Venezuela, where my sister lives. But when I was about to finish my training 
as a lawyer, the totally unexpected - and still surreal - fall of the Berlin Wall 
literally woke me up. It made me realize that the end of the Cold War could 
provide Europe with a fresh start and that this would mean new professional 
opportunities. 
 
Becoming a litigator in EU law  
With no post graduate diploma in EU law on my CV, I was not sure as to 
whether I would qualify for any profession having to do with European 
integration. After five and a half years of legal studies, which was the average 
length at the University of Bonn, and a further three years of training as a 
judge
5
, which is the prerequisite for becoming admitted to the bar in Germany, 
I could not imagine spending yet further time on studying. 
But this was over twenty-five years ago, when a postgraduate degree, at least 
for German lawyers, was an asset but not a must. At least this is what I 
believed. In fact, I was simply lucky that a small EU law firm in Brussels, 
where I had done an internship, valued my multi-lingual background and hired 
me.  
                                                          
5
 “Referendarzeit” 
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Today’s job market for lawyers is radically different. The “generalist” lawyer 
of the old days is no longer the standard, and the combined effects of an 
oversupply of qualified law students and an ever-increasing number of legal 
norms and special areas of law have turned specialization, and thus post 
graduate studies, into a de facto must. This has also narrowed the gap between 
legal education and the enormous changes the legal profession has undergone 
(Friedman, 2005).  
Perhaps due to the limited size of the first law firm I joined, I soon got the 
chance to plead my first case at the ECJ. It all started with a fait accompli, not 
exactly ideal for someone with little professional experience: shortly before the 
oral hearing in what was a rather complex case about fiscal and social security 
issues, the partner, who was supposed to plead this case for the European 
Commission, very unexpectedly decided that I should replace him. While 
preparing the pleadings, I saw this as both a unique first opportunity and a 
potential nightmare. I quickly sensed that this was not only about thoroughly 
preparing the pleadings, but also having the right mental attitude. This would 
not be a moot court competition, but real life, i.e. pleading a complex case 
before highly qualified judges and facing questions, with only seconds for 
answering them. This, I felt, required a level of mental robustness and agility 
experts tend to have as a result of years of experience, while I was still at the 
bottom looking uphill.  
This is when I remembered that as a schoolboy I had read a number of books 
on how to influence the human mind through “positive thinking” (Carnegie 
1936, Hill, 1937, Peale, 1952). I thus promised myself that after the oral 
hearing I would start reflecting more thoroughly on this somewhat forgotten 
subject.  
 
Close encounter with positive thinking 
In essence, I learned four important lessons from having a fresh look at those 
books.  
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Firstly, that the “mind” is a formidable potential source of energy and a major 
factor for improving and succeeding in one’s personal and professional life. 
Regrettably, our educational systems, no matter their level, do not currently 
provide any specific guidance in this respect beyond a furtive hint or two. We 
are taught so many things about the sciences, foreign languages, and other 
important subjects, and yet, in my own children’s experience as well as that of 
young lawyers, I do not perceive that anyone is teaching or even making 
students aware of how to harness the functioning of the mind and, even more 
importantly, how to make life-enhancing use of it beyond the more traditional 
use of learning matters by heart, mastering analytical reflection, etc.  
That said, there seems to be, here and there, a promising evolution, as e.g. 
schools in Heidelberg/Germany have added the subject “Happiness” (“Glück”) 
to their curriculum (Herpell, 2013), possibly inspired by an initiative of the 
government of Bhutan, which “measures prosperity by gauging its citizens' 
happiness levels, not the GDP” (Kelly, 2012).  
Secondly, unless one happens to be blessed with a pre-formatted mind-set, one 
has a lot to gain from exploring how to take advantage of one’s mind. This 
requires embarking on a dialogue with oneself and thus demands readiness to 
become an autodidact. I see this as not only a refreshing experience, but also 
one where one is almost totally sovereign. 
Thirdly, I quickly gained the impression that finding a suitable technique for 
working on mind-set would not require an in-depth understanding of human 
psychology, as this is something even renowned psychiatrists such as Freud 
and Adler and philosophers like Hegel and Kant could not even agree upon. In 
addition to being complex, deep philosophy and psychology hardly lent 
themselves to my practical purposes.  
Fourthly and most importantly, I knew that I had to find a simple and 
sustainable method of how to take advantage of my mind for my professional 
and private life – and that this would become a life-long exercise. 
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Implementing the theory 
At the end of the day, what matters to me is not so much exploring a theoretical 
understanding, but effectively putting it into practice, i.e. achieving results.  
As a first step, I was eager to avoid getting overwhelmed by the broad 
spectrum of publications on the functioning of the mind in general, and 
“positive”/”creative” thinking in particular. These range from academic works 
on the effects of mindset on behavior (e.g. Weinstein, Lyon, 1999; Armor, 
2003; Gollwitzer, 2012) to books on positive thinking and success in general 
(e.g. Dweck, 2006 and 2012) to more thematic publications, e.g. about the link 
between positive thinking and growing rich (Peng, 2013) to publications 
focused on specific types of individuals, such as entrepreneurs (Bandura, 
1977), sportsmen (Sheard, 2012), students (Adams-Schoen, 2013), or soldiers 
(Weiss, Davis, 2003). I was concerned – rightly or wrongly – that more 
contemporary authors, who are unsurprisingly numerous, may be motivated by 
achieving commercial success by implying they had discovered the secrets of 
business competitive edge and how everyone could be a ‘leader.’ 
I decided to concentrate on a few older publications, which carried simple and 
unpretentious messages, such as those of Dale Carnegie, who was born into 
poverty on a farm in Missouri and often quotes the Bible (Carnegie, 1936); 
Helene von Damm, a former Austrian steno-typist, who later became US-
Ambassador (von Damm, 1987); and Norman Vincent Peale (Peale, 1952). 
I became increasingly convinced that what I was looking for was a personal 
technique that would produce evidence, effective results in my professional 
context. 
I evaluated each book using criteria such as relevance and purpose and 
extracted two or three iconic sentences out of each book. I complemented this 
by reflecting on the techniques used by advertising companies. I chose a few 
advertisements which I felt carried powerful messages which could be turned 
into a personal motto or what is more commonly referred to today as a mantra. 
For instance, I opted for a French advertisement for a cleaning product, which 
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said something similar to, “if it is empty, there is still plenty”6. For my positive 
thinking purposes I translated this into something like: I will achieve my goal, 
since the power of my mind is endless, regardless of what happens.  
At the same time, I knew that any motivational mantra if repeated often enough 
could lose its ability to motivate unless supported by visualization and actively 
applying these mantras to resolving the various challenges I face in my 
profession. 
By engaging in this critique, I now see that a mantra is also a technique for 
controlling anxiety so that energy can be used for action and solution rather 
than being dissipated by worrying. Successful solutions prevent and - in any 
event - dissolve the anxiety. Or, rather, they help transform anxiety into a 
source of positive energy. 
In addition, in my case this anxiety reducing technique has also over time had 
given me more space and energy to reflect on myself and my motivations, 
others' motivations, and mutual influences on our thinking. This is not only 
fundamental to the agility and skills I need to perform effectively in my 
professional life as a litigator but also vital for more smoothly running of my 
personal and social life.  
 
Multilingualism – a richer concept than simply speaking foreign languages 
A further professional prerequisite is good written and spoken command of 
several foreign languages, ideally English and French, which clearly dominate 
the world of EU institutions. 
In EU litigation, French has, de facto, a particular importance since it is the 
working language of the ECJ (I will come back on this in Section 3. below). 
Any other language chosen by any applicant to the Court will be translated and, 
at the hearing, interpreted into French. Hence, it helps considerably if one has 
the skills to write a legal submission with an eye to translating it into French. 
The same is true for oral pleadings given the complexities of linguistic and 
                                                          
6
 “quand il n’y en a plus il y en a encore” 
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cross-cultural interpretations. Also, clients may wish to discuss their case in 
French, even if the language of the case is e.g. English, or vice-versa. 
Switching between several languages in the context of the ECJ is very 
common. 
That said, there is another linguistic challenge, which, from my experience, 
some younger lawyers tend to underestimate: that of a good command of one’s 
mother tongue, in particular in writing, starting with fully mastering 
orthography and also the exact meaning of certain words. The reasons for these 
deficits is a subject which merits more time and research, but I have more than 
once had the impression that those concerned, who are so often ready to learn 
foreign languages, tend to be either unaware of the problem and/or immune to 
any constructive feedback. As I see it, even one’s mother tongue is not 
acquired once and for all and a university degree does not come with a 
linguistic quality label, as some may believe.  
However, the preservation of one’s mother tongue is also intricately tied up 
with one’s identity and sense of belonging to a given culture. These need to be 
more deeply understood and respected in life as well as in the international 
legal systems.  
Also, somewhat unexpectedly, I discovered Butzkamm’s theory that “the 
mother tongue is the master key to foreign languages, the tool which gives us 
the fastest, surest, most precise, and most complete means of accessing a 
foreign language” (Butzkamm, 2003: 29-30). 
The coincidental advantage of growing up bilingual, which - I can confirm - 
makes access to further languages easier (Thordardottir, 2006), made me 
realize that this other dimension to languages exists. A language is a vital 
component of culture (Trivedi, 1978), culture being “the sum of all the learned 
and shared elements that characterize a societal group” (Brooks, 1964: 83). 
Thus, foreign languages are not merely an instrument for communicating 
verbally with others, but also an important key for understanding and 
connecting to other mentalities and cultures (Deneme, Ada, Uzun, 2011).  
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One of the most comprehensive texts I have read relating to culture, language 
and translation is “Translation Studies at the Interface of Disciplines” (Duarte 
et al, 2006). 
In this book Chesterman suggests the value of a definition of culture proposed 
by Kroebar and Kluckholm (1952: 181):  
“Cultures consist of patterns, explicit and implicit of and for behavior acquired 
and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive element of human 
groups, including the embodiment of artefacts; the essential core of culture 
consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and 
especially their attached values. Culture systems may, on the one hand be 
considered products of action, on the other hand, as conditioning elements of 
future action.” 
Chesterman then uses this definition to support a way to map the contemporary 
context of translation that goes beyond the strict literal translation of texts. 
These complexities and contexts require significant skills when conducting the 
everyday work of the ECJ.  
“With respect to translation, this means that we can now map out the main 
regions of our “spatial” context as follows (in addition to the immediate textual 
context): 
- Cultural context : focus on values, ideas, idiologies, traditions etc. 
- Sociological context: focus on people (especially translators) their 
observable group behavior, their institutions etc 
- Cognitive context: focus on mental processes, decision making etc 
Some of the concepts we use in Translation Studies fall on borderline areas and 
this has perhaps contributed to the way these borders have become blurred.” 
Again, it is one thing to know this in abstracto and another to be aware of how 
to integrate it into one’s professional and social life in the context of a 
multilingual environment:  
In my experience, others’ perception matters a great deal. My colleagues and 
clients tend to appreciate it if I understand them not only from a purely 
linguistic point of view, but also with respect to their culture, traditions, and 
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ensuing mental pictures. Indeed, those who are aware of this and make the 
requisite effort will appear to others to be less confined to their own national 
cultural and mentality – which is a prerequisite in a multi-national professional 
environment such as mine.  
Rosenberg very rightly points out that for a relationship with clients to be 
professional it should also be human (Rosenberg, 2003-2004). But in my view 
this is not to be misunderstood as referring to yet another marketing technique 
consisting of adopting some sort of human façade in order to put the client 
more at ease, let alone tapping people’s shoulders in order to appear as the 
sympathetic or otherwise jovial lawyer. It is about the ability to provide high-
level legal advice while remaining genuinely human and keeping some room 
for non-opportunistic humility.  
This touches upon an aspect which goes well beyond this context statement, 
but which I see as a very important goal in life: to be able to achieve the right 
blend of a myriad of personal and professional factors to become and remain a 
decent person during what is necessarily a furtive role as a guest on our planet.  
I have found my own perception also matters. It would be too functional and 
narrow an approach if I were to perceive foreign languages only as a mere 
linguistic means to an end, rather than as a prerequisite for discovering and 
accessing the added values of other cultures and mentalities. My professional 
spectrum is not limited to the 28 Member States of the EU, since I also advise a 
number of EU-funded and – based international agencies which contribute to 
the industrial and agricultural development of African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries and thus employ nationals from these parts of the world. When 
communicating with staff from e.g. Senegal, St. Lucia, or Fiji, the “foreign 
language” aspect becomes rather marginal, as compared to the art and the 
pleasure of managing to bridge cultural differences. 
By the same token, I have experienced that this perception leads to enthusiasm 
that in turn eases the learning – and indeed any – process (Peale, 1967).  
At the same time, I am not worried that this could come at the price of diluting 
or even losing my own cultural background and roots. On the contrary, quite 
often this helps me become more aware of the advantages and disadvantages of 
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my own cultural origins. This has made me realize that no matter how 
convinced or proud I may be of my heritage, my own culture is not, and cannot 
be, an absolute yardstick – as tempting as such belief may be. To me, this is, 
beyond the purely professional and personal sphere, one of the unwritten 
prerequisites for preserving a community of peace and prosperity. Indeed, this 
is what European integration is ultimately all about – regardless of the 
weaknesses and sometimes outspoken errors, if not aberrations, of the 
integration process.  
As a result, I am convinced that there is a limit to those schools of thought 
which advocate the idea of a lingua franca for the EU institutions, i.e. English 
(Seidlhofer, 2001; Canagarajah, 2007; Oltermann, 2013), even though it is 
promoted by the current German head of state, Joachim Gauck (Connolly, 
2013). The principle of adopting any single language as an official language 
has serious limits. 
No one seriously questions that any form of commercial or other exchange 
within the EU is easier if all participants speak the same language. That said, if 
all participants, except the native speakers, perceive such choice of a lingua 
franca as serving an obvious professional purpose, this modus of 
communication will hardly achieve more than that, i.e. connecting to another 
culture. It will be perceived as purely functional and its potential to 
interconnect cultures will remain limited accordingly.  
Besides, as some pretend, a good command of English is no guarantee of 
successful legal communication amongst lawyers from different legal systems 
(Ristikivi, 2005).  
Hence, communicating in several foreign languages in order to connect to other 
mentalities and cultures became an important complement and indeed catalyst 
of the more legal side of my profession. Since my reflections on language and 
culture became an intrinsic part of my Court work, they quite naturally became 
part of the spirit in which I would work on my publications in general and my 
Commentary in particular. Ironically, writing my Commentary in English 
meant taking advantage of the functional advantage of a single language, which 
is the one best understood on all five continents.  
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Publishing 
Working on my Commentary, closely followed by my work on this context 
statement, also led me to reflect on publishing in the broader context of my 
profession. Many lawyers have interesting insights or expertise in areas which 
deserve to be shared with others and yet, for a variety of reasons, they do not 
publish. Others undertake the effort without reaching the required threshold for 
being published. As a well known German law journal once told me: “You 
cannot imagine the number of articles we need to refuse, which is particularly 
delicate when written by otherwise well-known scholars.” During the many 
years spent on the Commentary I constantly reflected on the reasons for this.  
It is my perception that the reason for publishing an article in a law journal 
should not be solely determined by self interest, be it as a marketing 
instrument, a means to enrich one’s CV, or, more prosaically, to impress 
oneself or others.  
It is also about sharing knowledge and experience with others. This  is not only 
a value per se, but is likely to have positive effects on the quality of future 
publications, which serves both the author and the readership.  
That said, in the context of the legal profession, unlike academia, there is no 
professional requirement to publish. In some instances, depending upon the 
area of specialization, there may be little or no demand for legal publications, 
while on other topics there might be inflationary publishing.  
The time factor is very likely to deter some from publishing. In addition, law 
journals like academic journals tend to carefully select what they publish, 
which in turn depends on factors such as the subject, the epistolary talents of 
the author, contemporary issues, market demands, and competing offers. That 
said, this might be less the case with respect to shorter notes, such as 
annotations of judgments or brief commentaries on a new piece of EU 
legislation.  
I have opted for the following approach: 
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Apart from the obvious idea of making myself known within my profession 
publishing provides me with an opportunity to alternate between two 
complementary activities, practising and publishing. I thus perceive the 
seemingly cumbersome and time-consuming activity of publishing as a self-
chosen piece of freedom or, less idealistically, as a self-inflicted constraint on 
recreational effects.  
Publishing, as I see it, also contributes to “lifelong learning,” a concept that 
sees education as a continuing aspect of daily life so much so that quotes from 
noted achievers and commentators have become proverbs for the lifelong 
learner. These proverbs include Plato’s “The object of education is to teach us 
to love what is beautiful” from The Republic; and Einstein’s “Intellectual 
growth should commence at birth and cease only at death”. A more modern 
and well-articulated version is Lindeman’s “Orthodox education may be a 
preparation for life but adult education is an agitating instrumentality for 
changing life” (Jarvis 2009:515).  
Every professional is likely to have his or her own understanding of what 
lifelong learning means. For many, undertaking and demonstrating continuing 
professional development is a condition of remaining a licensed practitioner, 
while for others it is self-motivated. It can take many forms; publishing, except 
for academics, is not a prerequisite for practice, promotion, and lifelong 
learning. 
My challenge in this regard is similar to the one I faced concerning my 
“mindset”: success is likely to come from combining simplicity with 
sustainability. This approach has led me to publish mainly on subjects that are 
part of my daily work as a litigator, such as legal remedies at the EU Courts 
and procedural rules.  
The seemingly “dry” subject of litigation has its share of ironies, as is the case 
in other professions: while I value procedural rules as a comparatively well-
structured area of law, with little room for politics to interfere or distort (as can 
be the case elsewhere in EU law) I have also learned that on some – admittedly 
rare – occasions, intentional disregard of a procedural rule may actually 
improve the substantive arguments of a case. 
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Take, for example, Case C-424/97, Salomone Haїm II v. Kassenärztliche 
Vereinigung Nordrhein-Westfalen,
7
 which I pleaded for the European 
Commission. This case was about an Italian born dentist who had to fight a 
long battle in order to be admitted into the profession in Germany. First, he had 
to challenge the local authority’s refusal to recognize the dentist diploma he 
had obtained in Turkey, to where he had emigrated during the war for religious 
reasons, despite the fact that the said diploma had been recognized by Belgium. 
In response to the ECJ’s ruling, the competent German authority accepted the 
diploma, but argued that admission as a dentist was nevertheless excluded 
because Mr. Haїm’s level of spoken German would not be good enough; this 
constituted a “serious deficit of the personality” within the meaning of the 
relevant national law.  
At the oral hearing before the ECJ, I offered commentary on the full text of the 
relevant German law even though the ECJ technically has no jurisdiction over 
interpreting the national law. This German law provides that persons who 
suffer from drug addiction, mental disorders or “similarly serious deficits of 
the personality” are not to be admitted to the profession. This made it clear that 
the German authority’s interpretation of this law was manifestly unlawful 
under German law - which is not a matter for the ECJ to assess - and 
inappropriate and indeed particularly tasteless given the personal ordeals Mr. 
Haїm had to endure during the war. Under these circumstances, it became a 
personal matter for me to convince the ECJ – sitting in full Court – that the 
German administration had misused this national provision in order to prevent 
Mr. Haim from becoming a dentist in Germany. 
I did not care that my argument was, strictly speaking, outside of the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction. Given the particular circumstances of this case and the appalling 
and unjust manner in which this man had been treated by a national bureaucrat, 
what mattered above all for me was contributing to a just outcome for Mr. 
Haїm rather than slavishly complying with procedural rules, i.e. that the ECJ’s 
mission is not to interpret national law. Failing to do this would have come at 
the price of what I feel would have been a guilty silence.  
                                                          
7
 Judgment of the ECJ of 4.7.2000,  European Court Report 2000 p. I-5123 
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My list of publications (see Appendix 2) leading up to the major public work 
which is the focus of this critical engagement, comprises longer articles on 
specific procedural subjects as well as some annotations to judgments and 
guest contributions, which provide a refreshing opportunity for more political 
reflections.  
Some ten years ago I decided that a more comprehensive publishing project 
was required because hitherto no one had ever written a commentary on the 
procedural rules for proceedings at the EU Courts. However, I hesitated to 
undertake this project because I erroneously assumed, based on un-critiqued 
cultural conditioning, that the author of a law book in German needs to hold a 
PhD and be a professor. I corrected this assumption with some common sense - 
a book written for practitioners primarily requires the experience of someone 
who is both a practitioner and author. I would read a book written by such an 
author so I decided to write a book I would need and read.  
One inhibition I did not have that many authors face is that of being exposed to 
criticisms coming both from those from different perspectives and those 
coming from my own context. I have always seen publication and debate as a 
natural extension of what a litigator appearing in public court ought to be used 
to and ready for in any event. Publishing articles and, in my case, two 
commentaries on procedural law of the EU judiciary, the first one in German, 
in 2008 and the second one in English, in 2013 are an extension of this. 
The English book is the result of both experience gained from several hundred 
cases pleaded at the EU Courts and the publication of over twenty articles in 
legal journals.  
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SECTION 2 
Introduction to the “Commentary on Statute and Rules of 
Procedure” 
_______________________________________________________________ 
My overall contribution to the judicial system of the EU is this Commentary, 
the several hundreds of cases I have pleaded at the three EU Courts, and my 
various other publications. The Commentary is at the center of this context 
statement, because it is the first of its kind and covers six decades of 
contribution to procedural rules by the legislature, the EU Courts, and many 
individuals. I have used my experience as both a litigator and an author to 
inform and organize my analysis. My critical engagement with and evaluation 
of this Commentary will improve it while giving me the opportunity to 
critically reflect on a number of novel themes (see Section 3 below), which are 
important for my own professional learning and practice.  
 
My Commentary is addressed to both practitioners and academics, no matter 
their level of knowledge of EU litigation, as well as the EU legislature and 
judiciary and, last but not least, anyone interested in procedural matters at the 
EU Courts.   
 
The importance of the procedural rules of the EU judiciary and their 
complexity  
The purpose of any set of rules of procedure is to organize the practical 
modalities of access to justice, i.e. how the legal remedy chosen needs to be 
used during the written and oral proceedings. These rules are a codification of a 
broad variety of fundamental rights, such as the individual right to access to 
justice, to fair trial, to defence, and many other general principles of law, such 
as legal certainty and effective administration of justice.  
Many procedural rules apply to all legal remedies, no matter the subject of the 
proceedings, while some specific forms of judicial actions require specific 
rules. As to these rules’ importance, their very existence speaks for itself, since 
the best substantive arguments are literally worthless if a given legal remedy or 
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legal ground turns out to be inadmissible for failure of having complied with 
procedural rules such as time limits.  
The legislation governing the proceedings at the EU judiciary is spread over 
three different levels  
- The Treaty on EU (TEU) and, even more so, the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU (TFEU), which sets the fundamentals of the judicial architecture, the 
various legal remedies, etc., and the Statute of the ECJ (Statute), which 
contains the essential procedural rules; 
 
- The rules of procedure of each judicial instance, which implement the Statute 
in greater detail; 
 
- The “practice directions to the parties”, “instructions to the Registry” and 
further legislation autonomously adopted by the EU courts, which specify the 
most important rules of procedure by a multitude of binding practical 
provisions.  
The devil is, as so often, in the detail: For instance, the “Practice directions for 
parties before the General Court” limit, as a rule, the number of pages of 
written submissions to fifty or less, depending upon the type of legal remedy. 
This prevents lawyers from drafting sometimes extraordinarily long written 
submissions, as happened in the pas
8
, quite obviously because this was 
opportune in terms of billing their clients, to put it mildly.  
I see the current page limits as a compromise between safeguarding the rights 
of defence and limiting the Courts’ burden. While some practitioners believe 
that this would unduly restrict their rights of defence, they fail to take account 
the possibility to obtain derogation from this rule, which requires an amply 
reasoned application (Wägenbaur, 2013; idem 2014).  
 
 
                                                          
8
 The three applications in Joined Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic 
Container a.O. v Commission [2003] totalled 1500 pages, with over 100 files of annexes.  
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My reasons for opting for an article-by-article Commentary 
As its name suggests, this Commentary critically and comprehensively 
analyses each provision of a given piece of legislation, by following their 
sequence. This requires not only explaining the history, where relevant, the 
meaning, and the ratio legis of every article and its paragraphs, but also 
detecting possible inaccurate or misleading parts of a given provision and 
assessing the evolution, merits and possible shortcomings of the existing case 
law.  
After having published some twenty-five articles in legal journals and 
contributed to a major German Commentary on EU competition law, I 
published an article-by-article commentary of some four hundred fifty pages on 
the procedural rules of the EU courts in 2008 (Appendix 2). It became and still 
is the first of its kind in German legal literature, as confirmed by various book 
reviews (Appendix 3).  
Not long afterwards, my publisher convinced me to write an even more 
comprehensive book in English. This offer, which I couldn’t possibly refuse, 
came at the price of spending another four years on that project, until the 
“Court of Justice of the European Union, Commentary on Statute9 and Rules 
of Procedure,” was published in January 2013. It comprises some nine 
hundred pages and is, so far, the only article-by-article Commentary of its kind 
in English.  
The reasons why I preferred the English project to take the form of an article-
by-article Commentary rather than a monograph were as follows:  
There are already a number of English monographs on the EU judicial 
instances in general and legal remedies in particular (Appendix 4). When 
writing a monograph the author is free, to a large extent, to determine the 
structure and sequence of subjects, while a Commentary needs to follow the 
sequence of the law commented. This enables the reader to directly and rapidly 
                                                          
9
 Which on page 3 of the Commentary is misspelled as “Statue”, while the “Statute” of the ECJ 
is not yet that famous.  
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access all information available on a given provision. But it limits the room for 
providing an in-depth analysis of each and every aspect of a given provision.  
Contrary to what one might be inclined to believe, effective use of a 
Commentary does not require knowledge of the contents of the law(s) 
commented. Readers with little or no such knowledge need to consult the 
contents-summary anyway. This is also the case with a monograph. The 
difference, though, is that a Commentary provides the user with a complete 
reference list of all provisions and their respective headings, unlike a 
monograph.  
When opting for the Commentary format, I had some initial doubts, contrary to 
my publisher, as to which extent the potential readership would be familiar 
with this concept. After all, the concept of a Commentary is only well known 
in some European countries, such as Germany (who has a centuries-old 
tradition of article-by-article commentaries) (Kästle/Jansen, 2014), Austria, 
Switzerland and, to a far lesser extent, France and Belgium. Moreover, in the 
Anglo-American legal tradition the term “Commentary” has a different 
meaning, e.g. the famous 18
th
-century treatise on the common law of England 
by Blackstone (Prest, 2014).  
In the end, my slight concerns were unfounded, since EU law is clearly an 
emanation of the continental law tradition and, as a result, a number of article-
by-article commentaries have already been published, e.g. on EU copyright law 
(Stamatoudi/Torremans, 2014) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Peers, Hervey, Kenner, Ward, 2014). The fact that numerous libraries, such as 
the British Library
10
 or the US Library of Congress
11
, and even more 
importantly universities from the five continents, including Oxford, 
Cambridge, the LSE, Harvard, Stanford, Yale, McGill, Hong Kong, 
Melbourne, South Africa, etc., have bought the Commentary strongly suggests 
that the book’s format is not a deterrent, but instead filled a gap. Subsequent 
book reviews, such as Carrick’s (the Commentary was “long overdue”) and 
Picod’s (the Commentary was “awaited”) confirmed this (see Section 4 below).  
                                                          
10
 http://bnb.data.bl.uk/doc/resource/015664534 
11
 www.loc.gov 
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The size of the Commentary 
The size of a Commentary can be anything between a “pocket” version, which 
is hardly more than a brief explanation of each article, to a publication 
comprised of two or more volumes. 
All I knew when beginning my project is that my English commentary needed 
to be much thicker than my German commentary, where the upper page-limit 
set by the publisher turned out to be too low, especially since the ECJ’s rules of 
procedure were now much more numerous. In the absence of any specification 
by the publisher as to the page numbers I decided that the English book should 
be twice as long as the German one and in a bigger format.  
 
The target audience 
I was very much determined to meet the expectations and needs of as many 
categories of potential readers as possible (as explained in greater detail in 
Section 3 below):  
Potential and actual litigators in EU law
12
 are, by definition, important readers 
of my Commentary, since their case, no matter the merit of their arguments, 
needs to comply with applicable rules of procedure. Normally, any practitioner, 
regardless of his or her level of experience, must receive the maximum relevant 
information possible. Ideally, this will answer all his or her questions as 
quickly and effortlessly as possible. These needs vary according to each legal 
remedy and individual article concerned.  
The EU Courts are a further important addressee, which the ECJ confirmed by 
buying fifteen copies of the Commentary for its library, of which eight are on 
“permanent loan” in Judges’ cabinets (Appendix 5). This indicates that the 
judiciary uses the Commentary for its daily work.  
Since the ECJ also interacts with the EU legislature, it may use the 
Commentary when elaborating amendments to the Statute of the ECJ and the 
                                                          
12
 For grammatical convenience, I will use the personal pronoun „he“ generically to stand for 
all practitioners and stakeholders 
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Rules of Procedure before submitting those amendments to the Council of the 
EU. In 2012, i.e. even before my Commentary was published, the CST asked 
me to provide suggestions as to which provisions of its rules of procedure 
should be amended (Appendix 6). Subsequently, the CST incorporated a 
number of these suggestions into its new rules of procedure, which came into 
effect on 1 October 2014 (see Section 3 below).  
Scholars may use the Commentary as a source of inspiration for publication 
projects, as Carrick rightly finds in the concluding remarks of his book review 
(Appendix 7). Additionally, this is a potentially useful tool for law students 
with an interest in EU litigation
13
.  
 
The Commentary at the centre of the context statement 
I learned about the existence of the Doctorate in Professional Studies Program 
at Middlesex University and immediately felt that this was likely to open 
windows towards the contemplation of legal issues from new angles or a non-
conventional exploration of something as conventional as the EU rules of 
procedure. I was particularly attracted by this opportunity to switch from the 
role of author to one of critical assessor of my own work, an experience that 
goes well beyond the level of self-critical attitude that both the daily practice 
and publishing requires.  
Working on this context statement also provides me with an opportunity to step 
out of the “tunnel vision” which traps many if not most lawyers into believing 
that one should only discuss legal subjects using legal arguments.  
Ultimately this process, as I understand it, requires one to realize that becoming 
- and remaining - a professional in one’s own area of specialization is not just a 
matter of maximizing relevant knowledge, experience and know-how, as one 
would expect. It is also about acquiring the ability to take a critical look at 
one’s own work while understanding –and remaining aware - that the horizon 
is not limited to one’s own field of experience.  
                                                          
13
 See e.g. the reading list of Prof. Dr. Josef Azizi (University of Innsbruck), former Judge at 
the GC, www.uibk.ac.at/.../selbststaendige-publikationen 
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In theory, I knew this, but the context statement turned it into a real life 
experience. 
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SECTION 3 
The main work 
Is the commentary a major work? 
No legal journal would publish a lawyer’s case commentary with respect to a 
judgment he was involved in, let alone a review of his own book, given the 
obvious risk of a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, this is precisely one of the 
challenges I undertake in this context statement. I look forward to verifying 
whether and to which extent I am able to distance myself sufficiently so as to 
judge my work as objectively as possible.  
A first step in this direction is looking at other publications on the same 
subject. Since the creation of the ECJ in 1952, relatively few monographs on 
the judicial system of the EU as a whole have been published (Appendix 4), 
while there are a number of books and many articles in legal journals on the 
more iconic legal remedies before the EU courts (Appendix 8).  
As already mentioned above, in 2008 my German commentary became the first 
of its kind to cover the Statute of the ECJ and the rules of procedure of the 
three judicial instances of the EU. My Commentary in English became the next 
première in 2013, the first work of its kind in English.  
It is quite surprising that after a full half century of existence of the ECJ and 
twenty-five years after the creation of the now GC, no such Commentary has 
been published in English, even though it was “long overdue”, as Carrick 
rightly points out. While a few members of the EU judiciary have published 
commentaries, they cover a much broader area, such as the EU-Treaties 
(Advocates-General Léger and Lenz). Others have written monographs on 
procedural law (Judge Lenaerts and former Référendaire Dauses) (Appendix 
4).  
None of them opted for a Commentary on procedural law, even though they 
had at their disposal the archives of the ECJ and relevant human resources.  
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That said, the fact that my Commentary is so far the only one of its kind might 
set a certain standard, at least with respect to potential competing authors. But 
this alone does not necessarily turn it into a major work, given the absent 
comparison with other works.  
Assessing whether my Commentary is a major work requires determining 
whether it meets the following challenges:  
First challenge: critique of high quality legislation 
Over time, the legislature has improved the Statute of the ECJ and, in 
particular, its rules of procedure, with the help of what must have been an 
armada of high level legal experts from both within the ECJ, i.e. the institution 
proposing legislative changes, and from those at the receiving end of the 
proposals, i.e. the Council, which is the assembly of the Member States. A 
number of these amendments consisted of integrating case law, while others 
improved the wording or structure of existing provisions or removed lacunae 
or inaccuracies.  
Given the overall high quality of that legislation, reflecting on possible 
improvements and constructive criticism took me a considerable amount of 
time. This was made more difficult because I am the single author of this 
commentary. My efforts seem to have been fruitful, however, since a number 
of legislative changes I advocate in my Commentary are now contained in the 
CST’s new procedural rules14and the GC’s currently pending proposal for a 
recast of its rules of procedure
15
:  
 
Subject Previous / 
current provision 
Commentary New provision / 
pending proposal 
Court costs 
(CST) 
Art. 94 (a) RP CST 
Rule: no Court costs 
Exception: misuse of 
procedure, maximum 
of 2.000 € 
Explains need for 
increase to between 
7.000 € and 10.000 € in 
case of misuse 
Art. 108 RP CST: 
maximum 8.000 € in 
case of misuse  
Time-limit 
(for lodging 
formal plea of 
Art. 78 RP CST:  
Within 1 month of 
service of the 
Explains why one month 
is too short and 
Art. 83 RP CST: 
Time-limit of 1 month 
dropped, thus 2 
                                                          
14
 Which came into force on 1 October 2014 
15
 Dated 14 March 2014 
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inadmissibility)  application  advocates 2 months  months applies (as for 
statements of defence) 
Court costs 
(GC) 
Art. 90 RP GC: None, 
only avoidable costs 
need to be refunded 
Advocates extension to 
cases of manifest 
misuse of GC’s time 
and resources  
Art. 139 (a) of 
pending proposal of 
RP GC: “where the 
action is manifestly an 
abuse of process” 
Contents of an 
application 
(GC) 
Current Art. 44 (1) c) 
RP GC: Not very 
precise 
Stresses need for 
making provision more 
specific  
Art. 76 (d) of pending 
proposal of RP GC: 
makes provision more 
specific 
Contents of an 
application at 
the CST 
Art. 35 RP CST: 
“needs to contain the 
pleas in law and the 
arguments of fact and 
law relied on” 
Stresses the need to set 
out legal grounds and 
arguments “in a detailed 
manner within the 
application” 
Art. 50 (1) (e) RP 
CST requires a “clear 
summary of the 
facts” and a 
“separate, precise 
and structured 
summary of the pleas 
in law and arguments” 
Independence 
of a Judge 
 
 
Article 18 Statute 
ECJ:  
No implementing 
provision in the rules 
of procedure  
Stressing that there is 
“little or no guidance 
for parties confronted 
with the question of 
bias” 
Art. 16 of pending 
proposal of RP GC: 
specifies the 
procedure in Art. 18 
Statute ECJ “in the 
interest of 
transparency” 
 
Second challenge: spotting linguistic inaccuracies 
For the purposes of my Commentary I also scrutinized the legislation for 
linguistic inaccuracies. But with currently twenty-four official, equally 
authentic languages, I could only compare five major linguistic versions, i.e. 
English, French and German, which are the most important languages of the 
EU
16
, as well as Spanish and Dutch.  
The German language version of the rules of procedure contained the most 
outdated or otherwise unfortunate terms. For instance, the German term for 
“Deputy Registrar” is “Hilfskanzler,” which means something like “Auxiliary 
Registrar”. Not only does this have a slightly negative connotation, but it is 
also not in line with the importance of the duties incumbent upon the Deputy 
Registrar. In the recast of its rules of procedure the ECJ did change the title 
from “Hilfskanzler” to “Stellvertretender Kanzler,” i.e. Deputy Registrar.  
                                                          
16
 Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott in Case C-566/10 P, Italy v Commission 
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By contrast, the German version of the GC’s current rules of procedure17 still 
use the old unfortunate expression. However, its currently pending proposal
18
, 
suggests “Beigeordneter Kanzler”, meaning something like an Assistant 
Registrar.  
As in my German book, while drafting my Commentary, I also criticized the 
use of the term “Armenrecht” which hitherto was contained within the 
supplementary rules of procedure of the ECJ. This is an outdated term for 
“legal aid” and literally means “rights of the poor”. I had to drop this point, 
however, because it turned out that the German version of the new rules of 
procedure and supplementary rules of the ECJ no longer contained this 
expression.  
At this stage, given the high linguistic quality of the EU procedural rules there 
are quasi no linguistic inaccuracies left.  
By contrast, the rules of procedure of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO, 
apart from being remarkably succinct, still require some linguistic refining. For 
example, the English language version of the rules contain the 
expression“irreceivable”, which is a literal translation of the French term 
“irrecevable.” The accurate English term is “inadmissible”. Also, the final 
provision is even more unfortunately worded: “The present Statute shall 
remain in force during the pleasure [sic] of the General Conference of …” An 
entertaining congregation, it would seem.  
Third challenge: assessing the case law 
As a first step I used the “digest of the case-law” published on the ECJ’s 
website which is perhaps the major data base for ECJ judgments, containing 
extracts of the case law of all three judicial instances. The digest is structured 
according to the EU-Treaties and comprises a substantive chapter on legal 
remedies and procedural rules.  
This database is certainly a precious source of information, even though it is 
not up to date in every respect and comes at the price of two linguistic hurdles:   
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 Article 21: “Hilfskanzler”  
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 Article 33: “Beigeordneter Kanzler”  
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Firstly, the extracts of case law are only available in French, i.e. the working 
language of the EU Courts. This excludes quite a number of potential users, 
who will neither be able to find the parts they are interested in, nor, tragically, 
be able to subsequently access the links to other linguistic versions they 
contain. 
Secondly, only the ECJ’s judgments are systematically available in all official 
languages, unlike judgments of the GC and especially the CST.  
Costs and limited demand are good reasons for not translating all judgments 
relating to less important areas, such as Staff cases, into twenty-four languages. 
But it would be feasible to provide the “digest of the case law” in e.g. English, 
French, and German, which would make it substantially more user-friendly. 
Besides, this would also be within the spirit of the European Commission’s 
“Europe for Citizens Programme”, which is inter alia about “respecting and 
promoting linguistic diversity”19. 
The second step, which was to analyze and critically comment upon the case 
law, became a major challenge, as I not only needed to compile and read the 
various lines of case-law relating specifically to procedural issues, but also to 
assess and comment upon these issues’ evolution over time, something which 
had to be done for each of the three judicial instances. 
It would make the life of all interested readers easier if the EU judiciary would 
expressly indicate whenever it departs from its previous line of jurisprudence, 
even though such changes remain - reassuringly - rare. This is a practice 
applied by e.g. the German Supreme Court
20
. 
 
Fourth challenge: being a single author- benefits and drawbacks  
Did the writing of the Commentary as a single author in any way contribute to 
making it a major work? Certainly not ipso facto.  
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 http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/europe-for-citizens-programme/index_en.htm 
20
BGH, judgments of 9 October 1996 – Case 3 StR 220/96, BGH St 42, 255, 259 et seq. and of 
3rd July 2014, Case Az. I ZR 28/11 
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However, my single-author approach did enable me to publish my book a few 
weeks after the ECJ’s new rules of procedure came into force, meaning that at 
the time of publication my book could not possibly have been more up to date, 
as stressed in nearly all book reviews (Appendix 7). Also, when I contributed 
to a commentary on EU competition law (Appendix 2), I saw that co-authors 
failing to honor their deadlines delayed the publication for about two years, 
such that earlier contributors had to update their submissions. I had no interest 
in the same thing happening when writing my Commentary. Besides, there are 
simply not many EU lawyers who have extensive experience in both litigation 
and publishing; who have good knowledge of English, French, and German; 
and who are willing to invest a considerable amount of energy over a long 
period of time.  
The price of this approach is that I alone had to supply the motivation, energy 
and time it took to write the Commentary and reconcile this with a busy 
professional agenda and my family life.  
It was only after a brief period of mental “hangover” following the publication 
of the Commentary that I realised that what made me persevere was not only 
applied positive thinking (see Section 1 above), but a genuine passion for this 
seemingly arid, if not bone-dry, subject called the Statute of the ECJ and the 
rules of procedure of the EU Courts.  
Thus, in the course of writing this context statement, I came to the conclusion 
that my Commentary is a major work. This view is shared by e.g. Augustyniak, 
in his book review of June 2014 (see Section 4 below): “Bertrand Wägenbaur 
undoubtedly belongs to a group of excellent lawyers, showing a deep 
knowledge of the nuances and procedural complexities facing the ECJ…”. In 
his concluding remarks Augustyniak then notes: “One has to appreciate the 
author’s commitment especially as the presented work has pioneering 
character, taking into account such exhaustive discussion of procedural acts. It 
can therefore be said that B.Wägenbaur has resolved this task, and the work is 
worthy of recommendation in every respect.” 
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My understanding of research and development methodologies that may 
be appropriate to my Commentary 
Research methodology 
My research methodology consisted of discovering and implementing the most 
efficient way to find all relevant facts and materials to write my Commentary.  
The list of “classical” sources to be explored comprised the relevant case-law 
and case commentaries, where available, and, to some limited extent only, 
legal publications, including some press articles, previous and pending EU 
legislation regarding procedural rules, and my own experience as a litigator. I 
also took account of the procedural rules of some international judicial bodies.  
Case-law 
A number of procedural rules apply to all judicial proceedings, while others are 
specific to a given legal remedy, such as appeals or referrals for preliminary 
rulings or interventions. This turns all judgments or orders of the three EU 
courts into potential sources of procedural case law. This case law includes the 
way a given procedural rule and/or general principle of law is interpreted, to 
the way the Judges apply a given legal principle or line of case law to the facts, 
to the way they address factual and/or legal situations when the procedural 
rules are silent.  
It would have saved me considerable time if the ECJ, the source of this case 
law, operated a central and exhaustive database comprising all judgments and 
orders. Instead, the sources are scattered. I primarily relied on the “European 
Court Reports” (hereafter: ECR)21, and the ECJ’s electronic “digest of the case-
law”, the “search form” and the “numerical access to cases.”  
The ECR does not contain “all”22, but only the most important judgments. My 
methodology, as I had defined it, required me to verify each and every one of 
the – many hundreds – of volumes “by hand” because the index of each 
volume and the first page of each judgment/order merely contain a few 
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  Which recently ceased to be published, due to financial constraints.  
22
Unlike what is indicated on the website of a famous UK law faculty, 
http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/lrsp/print/eu.php#ECR 
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keywords indicating the subject concerned. These keywords only refer to 
procedural issues exceptionally, if they are at the heart of the proceedings. 
Thus, I had to manually go through each judgment and locate procedural 
issues. 
The “digest of the case law” provides free access to, inter alia, extracts of case 
law regarding the various general principles of law, legal remedies, and rules of 
procedure. Each of these main categories comprises sub-categories, each 
leading to further sub-categories, which, taken altogether, constitute a very 
large amount of information. Accessing and screening every bit of case law 
contained therein produced some duplicate work with the aforementioned 
exploration of the ECR. But it provided me with a welcome opportunity to 
complement my previous findings and, even more importantly, to verify 
whether I had well understood all the nuances of the case law contained in the 
ECR.  
I also extensively used the ECJ’s “search form,” which was improved some 
years ago. It enables the user to find relevant judgments and orders by either 
using words or keywords, the name of the parties, etc., or by accessing 
judgments and orders, both published and unpublished, which are listed 
according to the legal remedy or category of procedure concerned (e.g. appeal, 
legal aid, intervention, etc.). 
Research by search term provides endless opportunities for some types of 
research, such as discovering principles or concepts that are of some 
importance but where only little case-law exists, such as the concept of judicial 
bias. 
But what seemed so easy and convenient turned out to be cumbersome. I had to 
carry out the research using keywords in both English, i.e. the language of the 
Commentary, and French. Not all of the GC’s judgments are available in 
English, while the CST’s judgments are mainly available in French and the 
language of the proceedings, which is only very rarely English. The latter is 
almost tragic, since the CST’s judgments that are a particularly fertile source of 
procedure-related case-law. This gap is due to the sometimes extraordinary 
way in which EU lawyers either disregard the ECJ’s procedural rules or 
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attempt to interpret them in the light of principles drawn from their respective 
national backgrounds.  
In sum, this case-law research produced much more than a mere quantitative 
compilation to be mechanically inserted into the Commentary. It enabled me to 
spot and analyze any possible evolution of procedural case law in any of the 
three judicial instances, to compare this development across instances 
whenever their procedural rules were either identical or very similar, and to 
thereby discover aspects that I hitherto had ignored.  
 
Pending legislative proposals  
Normally, pending legislative proposals are not among the subjects to be 
discussed in a commentary. I included them only when I deemed it necessary 
by balancing the - unpredictable - agenda of the legislator, the importance of 
the changes proposed and the probability of such proposal being adopted with 
only few or no changes. Including less certain chances risks commenting on a 
hypothetical basis, something quite unthinkable in my profession in general 
and in law books in particular.  
I did not expect this to become a problem, until March 2011, well into the 
second year of working on the Commentary, when the ECJ submitted a major 
legislative proposal to the Council of the EU. The first part contained only 
some, albeit important, amendments to the Statute of the ECJ. But the second 
part turned out to be a complete recast of the ECJ’s rules of procedure. The 
hitherto one hundred and twenty five articles became two hundred and fifteen 
provisions, for a variety of reasons. Over the past decades, certain judicial 
procedures, such as referrals for preliminary ruling and appeals of GC 
judgments, had become increasingly important, while actions for annulment 
lost much of their initial significance. Moreover, the ECJ needed to remove 
certain ambiguities or even lacunae and make the rules of procedure more 
user-friendly by splitting a number of voluminous provisions into several 
articles.  
I was facing an unsolicited dilemma: 
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On the one hand, there was a reasonable probability that the Council would not 
substantially amend but rather rubber stamp the ECJ’s proposal about the rules 
of procedure. After all, this rule revision cannot be compared to the far more 
complex and unpredictable classical legislative process concerning EU 
Regulations or Directives, which involve the European Commission, 
Parliament, and Council. Thus, there was a good chance that the proposal 
would ultimately be accepted with no major changes, even though this was a 
major recast.  
But on the other hand, it was foreseeable that the financial and political 
implications of amending the Statute to increase the number of Judges at the 
GC from 27 to 39 would trigger long discussions and risked fierce opposition 
within the Council. Indeed, this issue is not yet over, as will be seen below.  
The biggest risk to the satisfactory completion of my Commentary was the 
possibility that the proposed changes to the rules of procedure would remain 
pending as long as the legislature had not agreed on whether to increase the 
number of Judges. This is exactly what happened, putting me in an un-ideal 
predicament as to which set of rules of procedure of the ECJ I should 
ultimately comment upon.  
What was the right method? To wait and see? To carry on with the work I had 
already done on the now-outdated rules of procedure? Or to start commenting 
on the pending proposal at the risk of substantial energies being ultimately 
wasted?  
I decided to speculate on the Council ultimately separating the issues, i.e. 
adopting the rules of procedure, while continuing to debate the increase in GC 
Judges. In the end, the Council separated the issues after two long years, when 
it adopted the ECJ’s new rules of procedure with only very minor amendments.  
My speculation paid off, and a few weeks later my Commentary was 
published.  
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Procedural rules and related case law of other international courts and 
Member States  
My research methodology would have been incomplete had I not compared the 
rules of procedure of the EU judiciary with and those of a number of 
international courts, e.g. with respect to time-limits, contents of written 
submissions, judicial bias, and other rules likely to be common to all 
international Courts. The courts I considered included the European Court of 
Human Rights (Strasbourg), which has jurisdiction over the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO 
(Geneva), which hears staff cases from various international organizations and 
the International Court of Justice (The Hague), which has, inter alia, 
jurisdiction in contentious cases between States and gives advisory opinions at 
the request of the organs of the UN.  
 
Monographs and articles in legal journals  
I deliberately opted for a restrained approach in my use of legal publications on 
the EU judiciary for several reasons: 
While there is now a large quantity of legal publications on judicial protection 
at the EU court, articles addressing specific aspects of the rules of procedure 
remain rare.  
Also, in their judgments the EU Courts never refer to legal publications, which 
also tends to be the case in Member State courts. Thus, whether and to which 
extent legal publications actually influence the EU judiciary remains unclear. 
In the case of the ECJ, there may be a very indirect influence, since Advocate-
Generals often refer to legal scholarship in their Opinions. As an example, 
between 2010 and 2012 my German commentary has been quoted by four 
Advocate Generals (Appendix 9), which seems to indicate that my German 
commentary is influential legal scholarship.   
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Development methodologies 
A further challenge was how best to use the vast quantities of information I had 
collected. Since I was not drafting the Commentary for myself but for any 
interested reader regardless of background, knowledge level, or reason for 
consulting my book, it was very important to take into account the expectations 
and needs of various target audiences (see Section 2 above).   
 
The multiple expectations of practitioners 
In my view, practitioners are my book’s primary target group. Practitioners 
expect more than a conventional analysis of each and every article. Instead, I 
needed to anticipate their myriad practical questions, which are at least as 
important to them. 
For instance, any lawyer seeking to obtain the green light for an “expedited 
procedure”23 for his client needs to know beforehand how much time he is 
likely to save with such a procedure. In certain proceedings, regarding e.g. 
merger control decisions, this time factor is crucial.   
With this in mind I inserted two tables indicating (1) the average duration of 
proceedings, and (2) the duration of expedited proceedings, detailed according 
to the various legal areas, such as competition, state aid, environment, etc.
24
. 
Since the GC does not publish the latter figures I had to find all orders where 
the GC had accepted a request for an “expedited procedure” and calculate the 
relevant time delays. This relieves the practitioner from undertaking such 
cumbersome exercises at a time when he is likely under time pressure anyway.  
Similarly, I compiled the relevant figures on the average duration of expedited 
proceedings and urgent referrals for preliminary rulings at the ECJ
25
.  
I had to do the same for taxation of costs. For many years this procedure 
remained rather obscure, since the resulting orders were often poorly reasoned 
and unpublished (Wägenbaur, 1997). Since then, transparency and technology 
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 Commentary, Article 76a RP GC.  
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 In his book review Picod welcomes the various tables inserted into the Commentary.  
25
 Commentary, pp. 202-203 
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have improved and many orders are now published. But this does not answer 
what is often the very first question of practitioners, i.e. which approximate 
fraction of fees and costs the other party will need to reimburse in the end. This 
matters for negotiations between the parties as well as any subsequent taxation 
proceedings at Court.  
I thus extracted the relevant costs figures from the abundant case law, i.e. the 
amount claimed by one party, proposed by the other side, and taxed by the 
judicial body concerned, and inserted them in tables, according to the various 
areas of EU concerned
26
.  
This saves considerable time for the reader and has never been done before in 
an English publication.  
Complementing missing case-law 
‘Development methodology,’ as I define it, also includes providing guidance 
about those provisions where there is hardly any case-law and/or authoritative 
publications. One example is Article 18 of the Statute of the ECJ that is about 
Judges having a conflict of interest. This provision remains surprisingly silent 
as to when there is a conflict of interest, and there is hardly any case law on this 
subject. It was clear that the practitioners expected me to not only explain the 
three or four relevant orders that I filtered out of an ocean of case-law.  
Thus I screened the relevant case law of some international jurisdictions and 
Member States and created three categories, i.e. bias, absence of bias, and 
borderline cases in relation to Judges and Advocates General. This required 
reflecting on a variety of situations likely to occur in judges’ professional and 
private spheres, past or present.  
I believe I had good reasons to take press articles into account for this subject. 
These articles e.g. criticized the fact that an Advocate General was giving his 
Opinion on whether medicinal products for human use should still be 
exclusively sold by pharmacies or via the internet, while his wife and daughter 
were pharmacists.  
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In my Commentary
27
, I also pointed out that Article 18 is summary in nature. 
The GC shares this view, since it has now proposed adding an implementing 
provision to its rules of procedure, which details the procedure in case of 
conflicts of interest
28
.  
 
Discussing legislative choices 
My Commentary would have been incomplete had I not reflected on the merits 
of the then still pending legislative proposals, such as the increase of the 
number of Judges at the GC
29
:  
There is an uncontested need to reduce the GC’s workload and thereby the 
average duration of proceedings in such important areas as competition, merger 
control, state aid, anti-dumping, agricultural policy, etc. given the applicants’ 
right to have their cases adjudicated “within a reasonable time” (Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU). My commentary points out that 
this proposal would in all likelihood result in a long dispute among Member 
States as to who would be entitled to nominate two Judges at the GC
30
.  
Regrettably, this is exactly what happened and after three years of fierce 
discussion the Council rejected the proposal.  
Since I saw this coming, I reflected on possible alternatives
31
, such as the 
creation of a further specialized Tribunal, e.g. for the intellectual and industrial 
property cases
32
, as was done in 2005 for civil service cases via the creation of 
the CST. But the ECJ did not submit any such or other “Plan B” to the Council. 
In November 2014, the ECJ proposed that each Member State nominate two 
Judges at the GC, while the CST would be abolished and its jurisdiction taken 
over by the GC. This appears to be a seemingly astute attempt to break the 
deadlock, since all Member States would be treated equally, thus taking away 
one major reason of discord. But the financial impact of this proposal will 
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 P. 38 
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 Article 16 of its draft rules of procedure 
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 Commentary, pp.141-142  
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 Commentary, p.141-142 
31
 Commentary, pp. 141-142 
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 Against decisions of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market  
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hardly please the main contributors to the EU budget. The perspective of a 
further deadlock looms. This is not helped by the fact that the ECJ again did 
not submit any alternative solution. 
 
Discussing the merits of case-law 
All readers, especially practitioners, may be interested in a critical 
contemplation of the case law regarding procedural rules. This will likely 
provide some with arguments in a given case, others with a subject for a 
publication (e.g. Wägenbaur, 1995; idem 1996; idem, 2003; idem 2007) and 
the Judges with some feedback. For instance, I critically commented
33
 upon an 
order of the CST in a taxation matter, where the Judges, sitting in full Court, 
radically departed from the well-established case law of the ECJ and the GC on 
the right of all EU institutions to be assisted by an external lawyer
34
. The CST 
held
35
 that as a rule, the institution needs to justify the reasons as to why it 
involved an external lawyer, as it otherwise would not be entitled to claim that 
lawyer’s fees from the other side if the latter needs to bear the costs. An order 
such as this CST order may not be appealed.  
I explained the reasons why this breaches Art. 19 (1) Statute of the ECJ in my 
Commentary. In an order regarding taxation delivered in March 2014, the GC 
argued along the very same lines as I did
36
.  
Whether my views influenced the contents of the GC’s order in any way is a 
matter for speculation, but it illustrates that my arguments were well founded 
and thus contributed to the development of knowledge.  
 
A communication exercise 
A further cornerstone of my development methodology is the manner in which 
I communicate information to the reader.  
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 Article 19 Statute ECJ  
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 Case F-55/08, De Nicola v EIB [2011], paragraphs 24 et seq.  
36
 Case T- 126/11 P-DEP, Marcuccio v Commission [2014] 
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It was essential for me to draft the Commentary so that various users enjoy and 
look forward to using it. I therefore opted for a simple and self-explanatory 
writing style. This also reflects the fact that many readers are swamped with 
reading material anyway and thus do not want my Commentary – and 
presumably any other legal publication – to be written in a complex, arid, or 
otherwise constipated manner.  
The yardstick is not whether I understand my prose, but whether every reader 
does. Achieving this remains a lifelong and rewarding challenge.  
A good writing and communication style is obviously an essential skill. During 
my legal studies there were no such courses, unlike in some UK and North 
American universities, where the concept of “legal writing” was extended to 
legal methodology. 
Thus, I had to learn things the hard way. While drafting the statement of 
defense in one of my first Court cases, the agent of the defendant, a major EU 
institution, agreed with the line of defense, but then told me “you need to write 
so that a cleaning lady understands”. After a quick smile at the idea of a 
congregation of cleaning personnel actually hearing the case, I was convinced: 
I had to get rid of the exam-distorted writing “style” which years of German 
university had inflicted upon me and adopt a simple and yet rich writing style.  
This became a Leitmotif for my professional activity; especially since EU 
institutions expect their external counsels to reach the same high-level writing 
skills as themselves. I am convinced that these specific requirements helped me 
to shape a writing style for my legal publications, including the Commentary.  
 
Limits to any methodology  
Legislation is, by definition, abstract and general. Thus no author will ever be 
able to anticipate each and every factual situation likely to be relevant under a 
given provision.  
But many readers of my Commentary nevertheless expect me to precisely do 
that, to the greatest extent possible. This became a challenge in itself, which 
my long experience as a litigator prepared me to begin addressing. But the next 
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step was then to try to anticipate as many factual situations which are (1) likely 
to occur in real life, (2) potentially relevant under the provision in question, 
and (3) where there is not yet any or only scarce relevant case-law.  
Experience helps to determine appropriate methodology for this undertaking, 
but one must also employ abstract and creative reflection. I believe that such 
creativity has less to do with a given methodology than with the ability to think 
or imagine outside mainstream methods. At the same time, such creative 
thinking needs to be kept within reasonable limits, for reasons of time and 
because a number of lawyers, depending on the subject, will literally play 
around with procedural rules in a surrealistic, unforeseeable manner. 
Anticipating such odd arguments is not of any interest to the majority of 
lawyers who make reasonable arguments before the Court. 
The reader certainly cannot expect a commentary to give guidance as to how 
best to circumvent a given procedural rule, even though some practitioners 
might be keen to learn just that. For instance, regarding Article 19 (3) Statute 
ECJ, which provides that individuals and legal persons must be represented by 
a lawyer, it was not my role to indicate the practical - and money saving - way 
out, which is that the party should draft the written submissions himself and 
then simply pay a lawyer for using his letterhead and signing the document
37
. 
 
Novel themes 
In my Commentary I criticize a number of legislative choices and subjects, 
although this critique was necessarily confined to legal arguments, in line with 
what the readership would expect from a legal publication. This present context 
statement provides me with an opportunity to elaborate on a number of these 
issues, while addressing others not covered before using arguments drawn from 
other disciplines. These are set out below: 
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 To be kept within reasonable limits, though, as paragraph 6 of the Order of 11.12.2014, Case 
F-114/14, Marcuccio v Commission, illustrates, where the CST expressed its doubts as to 
whether the application had been drafted by a lawyer.  
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First theme: The ECJ’s working language, a relic of the past?  
As a rule, those who go to Court may choose one of the twenty-four official 
languages of the EU. It is less known, however, that internally all three judicial 
instances of the EU use a single working language: French.  
The latter is an unwritten rule that dates back to the days of the six founding 
Member States. At the time, three of the founders have French among their 
official languages, while the other Member States’ languages, i.e. Dutch, 
German, and Italian, had no comparable weight. This status quo was then 
automatically extended, in 1988, to the then CFI, now known as the GC, and, 
in 2004, to the CST. As a result, French remained the judiciary’s internal 
working language throughout the various waves of enlargements, which saw a 
total of twenty-two Member States joining what has now become the European 
Union. The first three, including the UK, joined in 1973 and the most recent 
new member, Croatia, in 2013.  
 
Is French still the common denominator?  
The little-explored question is whether this working language is still 
appropriate in a Union of twenty-eight Member States. Are all Judges able to 
deliberate in French? This question is primarily relevant for the ECJ and the 
GC, which currently have twenty-eight Judges each, more than for the CST, 
which only has seven Judges and where French remains the dominant language 
of the proceedings. 
There is circumstantial evidence that French is not the common denominator 
among the Judges:  
All statistical figures confirm that English is the first foreign language spoken 
in Europe, well ahead of French
38
. Of course this cannot simply be extrapolated 
to the EU Judges in general, bearing in mind their educational and professional 
background, average age, and other uncommon characteristics in comparison 
with the population as a whole. But, for the vast majority of Judges French is 
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neither their mother tongue nor the first foreign language they learned. This is 
particularly true for all Eastern European and future Member States. 
Also, it is one thing to understand French, but another to be able to deliberate 
in camera, i.e. with no interpreters, on complex issues of EU law. It speaks for 
itself that during the oral hearings, in particular at the ECJ, a number of Judges 
use either their native language or English when putting questions to the 
parties, which are simultaneously interpreted into the language of the 
proceedings. 
While the former are entitled to do so
39
, this illustrates that they don’t master 
the ECJ’s working language sufficiently to express themselves orally, even 
though all it would take, in the case of pre-prepared questions, is reading the 
French translation to the parties. 
If this is the case when asking questions at an oral hearing, what does this mean 
when it comes to the Judges deliberating amongst themselves after the oral 
hearing?  
But the ultimate evidence is provided by the advisory panel (see “The 
nomination of Judges” below) itself, since it also verifies the candidates’ 
“ability to acquire proficiency, within reasonable time, in the working 
language of the European courts”40. In other words, it very much seems that 
those who are supposed to contribute to the ECJ’s “constitutional role”41 in 
reviewing the EU's basic legislative activities and interpreting the Treaties, and 
regulations/directives of the EU are being kindly invited to first take French 
lessons.  
 
Room for change?  
From my end of the spectrum, there is hardly any room for a radical change of 
the ECJ’s working language, as this would most certainly result in a political 
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 Third Activity Report of the Panel provided for by Article 255 TFEU, 13 December 2013  
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confrontation between Member States. The ECJ, despite its right to determine 
its internal functioning, might be caught in the middle of this.  
Risk of political controversy 
The ECJ is most certainly keen to avoid yet another political controversy. It is 
already more or less recurrently criticized for having a tendency to “build a 
government of Judges” (Broeksteeg, 2011), and/or not to reason its judgments 
sufficiently (Dawes, 2007). While this was, for quite some time, a matter 
discussed among legal experts, it has since then reached some of the highest 
political spheres in some Member States (Herzog, Gerken, 2008). Even though 
(or perhaps because) such criticism regarding the ECJ has not yet become a 
part of the standard repertoire of critiques, unlike e.g. the European 
Commission, there is every reason to be cautious and avoid yet another 
political controversy.  
The comparatively modest issue of open competition recruitment notices 
clearly indicating the second language required of candidates for EU official 
positions, which is most often English, has already sparked controversy 
between Member States, with Italy
42
 and Spain
43
 arguing in court against 
making strong English a mandatory requirement. 
Other Member States, such as Germany, are recurrently lobbying for a more 
rigorous application of the European Commission’s three working languages, 
i.e. English, French, and German, arguing that in practice English tends to 
prevail and that the use of German should be strengthened.  
Certain Member States who are in favour of French could also use any radical 
change of the working language as a pretext to question whether the ECJ has 
adequately fulfilled its important role in the past. Indeed, any official change of 
working language would suggest that many Judges may not have been 
sufficiently able to express themselves in French, which in turn may have 
affected the quality of their work. This may seem speculative at this stage, but 
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when it comes to languages, all Member States have shown remarkable 
tenacity in defending their languages.  
Besides, any radical change, such as replacing French with English as the 
ECJ’s working language, could also entail dissent within the ECJ from those 
judges most proficient in Latin languages. This could also reignite the debate 
for those who consider that the French language is more precise than English 
(Vinay/Darbelnet, 1995), yet another vast subject.  
In addition, giving French and English equal status at the ECJ, as is the case at 
the ECHR, would generate translation costs and delays.  
 
Possible approach  
As an alternative to a radical change of working language the current 
arrangements could be made less rigid. For instance, instead of imposing 
French as a working language to all its chambers, the GC could give each of 
them a choice between French and English. Each formation of Judges could 
then choose which language they prefer by majority vote or on an ad hoc basis. 
After all, between 2009 and 2013, the GC heard 1041 cases in English and only 
475 in French during the same period (Appendix 10), but subsequently, the 
Judges deliberated on each case in … French.  
If such arrangements were to materialize, they would only apply to the 
deliberations. The judgments would still be drafted in French, since it would 
come at a considerable cost to adapt the ECJ’s translation services to a 
language other than French.  
 
Second theme: Twenty-four official languages 
Over the years, the number of official EU languages has risen dramatically, to 
twenty-four, as a result of successive EU enlargements and because the EU is a 
unique political instance where many different languages coexist in a 
comparatively small geographical area.  
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Solutions creating problems 
National languages are a fundamental part of national identity and culture 
(Trivedi, 1978) and are thus often enshrined in the national constitutions
44
. 
Consequently, they enjoy a special status under EU law. Not only does this 
mean the EU now has twenty-four official languages, but Art. 64 Statute ECJ 
guarantees that this will not change, since it provides that “the rules governing 
the language arrangements applicable at the Court of Justice of the European 
Union shall be laid down by a regulation of the Council acting unanimously.” 
This impossibly high procedural bar speaks for itself.  
Due to the magnitude of this linguistic régime, all European institutions, 
including the ECJ, need to have large translation units. The European 
Commission has two Directorates General for this purpose, one responsible for 
translations, the other for interpretations. In addition, there is the Translation 
Centre of the EU in Luxembourg. This has led to recurrent criticism regarding 
the cost of translations for all EU institutions (see. e.g. Owen, 2005). 
How well-founded are those criticisms?  
In 2006, all EU institutions taken together spent one billion euros on 
translations (Castle, 2006), which is around two euros per EU citizen per year. 
This is not exactly a large amount.  
How much room is there to save on these costs? This is a popular question in 
times of tight public finances, but public expectations might go well beyond 
what can effectively be achieved:  
EU legislation, i.e. Regulations and Directives, are binding upon the Member 
States and thus must be published in all twenty-four official languages. 
Otherwise, the addressees would be at risk of breaching EU law out of 
linguistic ignorance.  
Regarding the EU judiciary, there is hardly room for further linguistic 
rationalization. Judgments of the ECJ need to be translated into all official 
languages, since this is the highest judicial instance of the EU responsible for 
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interpreting EU law. In the case of the GC, only the more important judgments 
are translated in all languages, while in the CST, decisions are normally only 
available in French, i.e. the working language, and, as the case may be, the 
language of the case.  
Limiting the number of languages of procedure is equally unrealistic: Member 
States will never renounce using their language in ECJ proceedings, let alone 
accept a drastic solution, as seen at the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO, 
where applications may be only lodged in French or English. And who would 
have the political courage to convince the Member States to renounce their 
national language in proceedings at the GC, thus telling the majority of citizens 
and companies concerned that they may no longer use the official language that 
suits them? After all, the concept of European citizenship, which is enshrined 
in EU primary law
45
, includes the right to address the EU institutions in one of 
the official languages. Also, while the official languages of the Council of 
Europe are French and English, applications to the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg may be lodged in one of the official languages of the 
contracting parties
46
. Thus translations remain necessary; whether machine 
translation (Wagner, 2014) will substantially curb costs remains to be seen.  
There is a limit to the free choice of procedural languages though, since in 
appeals from the CST to the GC the “language of the case shall be the language 
of the decision of the CST against which the appeal is brought”47. In other 
words, the language chosen at first instance determines the language of all 
subsequent appeals. This rule is convenient for appeals since there is no 
additional need for translations. But in a number of instances, it limits the 
applicant’s right to turn to a different lawyer for the appeal, should he be an 
expert in the subject or procedure, but not a master of the language at first 
instance
48
. While the appellant may seek a derogation from this rule, provided 
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he lodges a duly reasoned application in a timely manner, he has no guarantee 
whatsoever that the appellate Court will accept such request.  
 
Problems awaiting a solution 
Other EU topics do have room for cost-saving, as one would expect:  
Every month, MEPs travel from Brussels to Strasbourg to attend a four 
daylong session, a “travelling circus” (Mendick, 2014) that comes at the price 
of one hundred and thirty million GBP per annum. Such expenditure is not the 
result of an objective necessity, but the price of a political symbol, since 
Strasbourg is one of the three cities, next to Brussels and Luxembourg, which 
are situated on the border line between the Germanic and the Latin world, two 
“tectonic plates” historically speaking.  
Today, however, this extensive travelling has become a major symbol of how 
substantial amounts of public money are wasted, year in and year out. Any 
change to this requires unanimity among the Member States, and the host 
Member State, France, is unlikely to support such change.  
But beyond the mere financial cost of the practice, it is time for all Member 
States to understand that this kind of chronic absurdity that contributes to 
mounting public opinion against the EU.  
 
Third theme: The nomination of Judges 
 
Introduction 
For many in the general public, it is almost a Pavlovian reflex to scrutinize who 
is to be nominated as a member of e.g. the European Commission. There is no 
such attention when it comes to those nominated to become a Judge at the EU 
Courts, despite their far-reaching powers.  
58 
 
Not surprisingly, the provisions governing the nomination of the Judges and 
Advocate-Generals at the EU-Courts
49
 remain little explored. Since such 
nominations cannot be challenged in Court, no case law sheds any light on this.  
The panel  
The substantive criteria for being nominated as an EU-Judge have always been 
particularly demanding
50
 and starkly differ from the simplicity of nomination. 
Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, each Member State would propose a name to the 
Council and the latter would normally rubber-stamp the proposal. Since then, a 
panel
51
 comprising seven members gives an opinion on whether a candidate is 
suitable to perform the duties of Judge or Advocate General.  
The system is, in principle, well thought out: while the panel’s views are not 
binding on proposing Judges nor other Member States’ approval, the latter 
have hitherto always followed the panel’s opinion52. That said, the panel can 
only accept or reject nominations; there is no open procedure where candidates 
are ranked in order of merit
53
.  
Up to this day, the panel has only found that five out of forty-one proposed 
persons were not suitable (Dumbrovsky, Petkova, van der Sluis, 2014), 
including one candidate from Malta (Camilleri, 2012) and one from Sweden 
(Jääskinen, 2013).  
Nevertheless, the current nomination “procedure” shows some deficits:  
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Member States not doing their homework 
The above-mentioned statistics illustrate that the Member States concerned did 
not use all appropriate means in order to determine beforehand whether the 
person they nominated fulfills the substantive requirements for an ECJ judge. 
Whether this is the result of politics interfering with the process, poor 
organization, underestimating the importance of the aforementioned criteria, or 
simply a de facto delegation of the “field” work onto the panel is a matter for 
speculation.  
What matters is that the substantive criteria in Articles 253 et seq. TFEU imply 
an obligation of the Member State concerned to thoroughly assess the 
candidate prior to making any formal proposal. Thus, it seems justified to 
specify in the relevant provisions that all Members of the Union are obliged to 
thoroughly vet their candidates, while they may determine the specific 
modalities of their national selection procedures for themselves. This would 
ensure dual review processes: one at the national source and a second review at 
the panel level.  
 
Gender equality 
A further little-explored issue is whether gender equality should be enforced 
within the EU judiciary, at least at regards the ECJ, given its constitutional 
role. This would mean that ideally, fourteen out of twenty-eight Judges should 
be women. Currently, out of thirty-eight members of the ECJ, i.e. the twenty-
eight Judges, nine Advocate-Generals and the Registrar, only six Judges and 
two Advocate-Generals are women.  
This leads to the question whether there should be more gender balance and, if 
so, how this is to be achieved. From a more political point of view a balanced 
composition of the ECJ might be a strong symbol. But from a legal perspective 
this seems to be more of an illusion than anything else:  
Firstly, the EU Courts are not an “employer” and even if they were they would 
not be under a de jure obligation to recruit an equal number of female and male 
Judges.  
60 
 
Secondly, the Member States are sovereign in nominating “their” Judge and all 
they need to take account of is the - very demanding - substantive criteria for 
the nomination of Judges, which is not a matter of gender, let alone gender 
equality.  
Any addition of such criteria bears the risk of making the nomination of EU 
Judges more political, while the panel was created in order to prevent such 
tendencies. Otherwise, we may as well turn back to the times when the 
European Parliament demanded, in the 1980s and early 1990s, that it should 
have the right to choose the Judges (Cordelli, 2013).  
Thirdly, the panel must carry out its assessment within the limits of its 
mandate
54
 and has thus no authority to add criteria regarding gender or any 
other aspect.  
Consequently, I am of the view that the composition of the EU courts is 
anything but the ideal test case for vindicating more gender equality in EU 
institutions.  
 
The selection of judicial assistants, a Judge’s prerogative  
Each Judge at the ECJ is assisted by three “référendaires,” i.e. judicial 
assistants, who carry out the bulk of the judicial work and all the “field work,” 
including drafting the judgments. This does not in any way suggest that the 
Judges’ role is thus limited to a more or less supervisory role, but it is very 
clear that without said assistants there is no way the individual Judge could 
ever cope with the workload.  
The legal status of “référendaires” is one of temporary agents55 who are given a 
mandate. But, by contrast to other EU temporary agents, there is no formal 
recruitment procedure. Every Judge is free to select the candidate according to 
his or her own criteria (Kenney, 2000). Then the Judge proposes his or her 
candidate to the President of the judicial instance, who either accepts or refuses 
the proposal. This exception to the normal recruitment procedure is justified by 
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the fact that there is a special relationship of trust between the Judge and the 
“référendaire,” the recruitment being thus “intuitu personae”56.  
There is no doubt in my mind that any Judge needs to be able to trust his or her 
“référendaire” professionally and morally, at all times, which makes the status 
of the “référendaire” specific enough to justify the absence of any formal 
selection procedure. But does this mean that the selection of the “référendaires” 
should remain a matter decided between the proposing Judge and the President, 
as it is now? In this respect, the following should be taken into account:  
In practice, the President must understand that any Judge needs to be able to 
rely on “référendaires” at any stage of his mandate. Thus, the President’s 
assessment of the person proposed is likely to be minimalistic, for a number of 
reasons. The President cannot substitute himself for the proposing Judge in 
assessing the relationship of trust towards the “référendaire.” And the President 
needs to carefully balance the level of scrutiny over these selections with the 
Judges’ autonomy, especially as the President needs be able to rely on the 
Judges - who elected him - at all times.  
All of this is perfectly understandable. But on the other hand, the 
“référendaires” are not the “personal” assistant of the Judge, since they are not 
remunerated by the Judge, but by the institution for which they work. More 
importantly, “référendaires” contribute substantially to the judicial activity of 
the EU courts. The question is thus whether one should reflect on a way to 
ascertain whether every candidate has the necessary qualifications for assisting 
a Judge or Advocate General. This would need to be a rather demanding 
examination comprising a written and oral part. Also, it seems appropriate to 
require a minimum number of years of experience, e.g. ten years. Such a rule 
would also prevent the age gap between Judge and “référendaire” being too 
big, given the Judges’ average age.  
Alternatively and at the very minimum, the President of the judicial instance 
concerned should seek external advice when it comes to recruiting or extending 
the contracts of the eighty-four “référendaires.” One way of achieving this 
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would be inviting the panel, which is consulted for ECJ judicial nominations, 
to give its views about the suitability of the “référendaires.” Even though the 
President of the ECJ or the judicial instance concerned would not be bound by 
that opinion, he would still benefit from experienced views of those outside the 
immediate context.   
 
Fifth theme: Referrals for preliminary rulings 
A referral for a preliminary ruling is a non-contentious procedure enabling any 
national Judge to ask one or several questions about how to interpret EU law 
provisions or whether an ECJ Regulation or Directive remains valid. National 
judges will normally do this if the answer is not to be found in the existing case 
law.  
The importance of this procedure for EU law in general is illustrated by a 
number of landmark judgments about e.g. the principle of the primacy and 
direct effect of EU law and the liability of Member States in the case of 
infringements of EU law.  
Inadmissible orders for referral, a chronic phenomenon  
Despite the obvious utility of this procedure for national Judges, year in year 
out, a number of referrals for preliminary rulings turn out to be either 
completely or partly inadmissible. Every inadmissible order is a waste of time 
and resources for both the ECJ and the national judges concerned and is also 
frustrating for all involved (Wägenbaur, 2000).  
Why is this still the case, after sixty years of existence of this consultative 
procedure? There seems to be a joint responsibility between the EU legislator 
and the national spheres in this respect. For many decades, until 2013, the 
ECJ’s rules of procedure did not even define the factual and legal content 
required for these orders (Wägenbaur, 2000), in contrast to the clear 
requirements governing the contents of applications, statements of defense, and 
other steps of the written proceedings.  
The ECJ was obviously aware of this lacuna, since it decided, in 1986, to 
publish “recommendations to courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation 
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of preliminary ruling proceedings,” which is a sort of vademecum. However, 
the ECJ’s statistics reveal that these recommendations, which were amended 
several times, did not substantially remedy the phenomenon, possibly because 
they remained unknown or were simply too abstract.  
In 2012, the ECJ finally decided to add a definition of the contents of an order 
of referral to its rules of procedure. But this did not really help either, as the 
numerous orders of inadmissibility handed down in 2013 and 2014 illustrate 
(appendix 11). 
 
Possible remedy 
A practical and simple way to curb the number of inadmissible referrals would 
be to provide the national Judges with a specific form for preliminary rulings. 
Such a form should contain chapters, headings, and sub-headings that 
accurately reflect the legislative definition of an order of referral, together with 
explanatory statements.  
However, using such a form could not be made compulsory and hence needs to 
be voluntary. It is true that in EU law the use of certain forms is compulsory, 
such as the “official forms for standard merger notifications” or the legal aid 
form. This is because both are part of EU regulations, which are, by definition, 
binding. This is different than a referral of a question for a preliminary ruling, 
which is based upon cooperation and mutual trust between sovereign Judges. 
Thus, the ECJ has no ability to require the use of any such forms. 
Instead, the ECJ could seek inspiration from the “nudge theory”. This is an 
alternative to direct instruction, which presents a nudge as “any aspect of the 
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” 
(Thaler/Sunstein, 2008: 4). 
Here, the ECJ could convince the national Judges of the added value of using 
the form. This could happen by showing how the form improves substantive 
contents of submissions, as well as layout and ultimately, user-friendliness. 
The ECJ could seek inspiration from studies (Gouscos, Rouvas, Vassilakis, 
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Georgiadis, 2002) or governmental documents
57
 on the correlation between 
layout, design, and colors of administrative forms and effective use by citizens. 
In my view, this is also a matter of how the form, once it is well designed, is 
presented. It could begin with an indication that the form is meant as practical 
guidance for national Judges and that using it is within the spirit of good 
cooperation between national Tribunals / Courts and the ECJ, a message which 
would be close to a de facto obligation, without being perceived as such.  
 
Sixth theme: Legal aid 
Legal aid is not the first subject that comes to one’s mind in the context of 
proceedings at EU courts, given that their jurisdiction differs so much from 
what we are used to in the Member States. Yet the rules of procedure of all 
three judicial instances provide such possibility for individuals. 
A somewhat unexpected and unexplored phenomenon, however, is why very 
many requests for legal aid to e.g. the GC are rejected as manifestly 
inadmissible because the GC has no jurisdiction for applications by individuals 
against other individuals, legal persons, Member or third States, etc. Persons 
applying for legal aid in order to sue e.g. universities, the Crown Prosecution 
Service or retailers, such as “Lidl” (Appendix 12) in the EU Courts, illustrate 
that there is a lack of knowledge or a failure in communication regarding the 
EU courts’ role and jurisdiction. Effective preventive action is urgently 
required.  
To some extent, this phenomenon may have to do with the fact that a request 
for legal aid is the only procedure before the EU judiciary where involving a 
lawyer is not compulsory.   
To prevent this, the GC so far provides advice within the “legal aid application 
form” which explains the limits of the GC’s jurisdiction. But one can tell from 
the number of inadmissible requests for legal aid that this does not remedy the 
problem. This regrettable and chronic situation needs a more efficient way to 
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prevent this phenomenon. One approach could be to making compulsory filling 
out an online form compulsory. This form could require the applicant, as a first 
step, to select one or several potential defendants out of a predefined list. 
Failure to do so would prevent the applicant from filling out the remainder of 
the form. For those who do not have a computer, something equivalent could 
be provided in paper form in order to ensure equal access to the application 
process. Such a measure is likely to prevent many manifestly inadmissible 
applications for legal aid from materializing.  
One could also reflect on a modest filing fee (e.g. 100€) to be reimbursed if 
application is found admissible. 
For all those who believe they have a cause, but not one that may be heard by 
the EU Courts, it is worth reflecting on other, more efficient means of 
publicity, such as contacting the press or a member of the European 
Parliament. This is of course their own decision and responsibility, as the ECJ 
has no guidance to provide them with such advice, be it via its website or 
otherwise.  
 
Seventh theme: Privileged status for EU civil servants? 
On the continent, the view that EU civil servants are too numerous and 
overpaid is widespread. Certain members of the UK press seem to agree 
(Murphy, 2012).  
This criticism is not well founded in every respect: with a workforce of about 
thirty three thousand, the EU creates and applies the common rules applicable 
to twenty-eight Member States with about five hundred Mio. citizens. By 
contrast, a single city such as Cologne, which has about one million 
inhabitants, employs the same number of civil servants as the EU, albeit at a 
lower pay grade. In addition, the public generally does not know that the 
Member States have recently decided to reduce the EU’s work force by 5 % 
over 5 years.  
In my view, there are other aspects, which lend themselves more easily to 
objective critique, at least from a lawyer’s perspective. For instance, while 
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individuals and companies from an EU state or a third-party country have a 
time limit of two months for lodging an action for annulment against a decision 
adopted by an EU institution,
58
 the civil servants of the EU are given a three-
month time limit
59
.  
What justifies such a substantial difference in treatment? Pursuant to a long 
line of case law, “there is a breach of the principle of equal treatment where 
two classes of persons whose factual and legal situations are not essentially 
different are treated differently or where different situations are treated in an 
identical manner”60. The same is true of the principle of non-discrimination, 
which is merely the specific expression of the general principle of equal 
treatment and constitutes, in conjunction with the latter, one of the fundamental 
rights of Community law. Persons seeking the annulment of an individual 
decision are in a comparable situation, as they also need to be represented by a 
lawyer. The difference is that prior to going to Court, EU officials need to 
initiate an administrative complaint against the individual decision. Thus, prior 
to going to Court, the complainant is already rather familiar with the factual 
and legal issues, while defendants do not have the opportunity of challenging a 
given decision by way of such complaint. 
This inequality is exacerbated by the fact that civil servants of the EU benefit 
from a time limit that is fifty percent longer than the “normal” two months 
applying to the average person.  
Moreover, many if not most contentious matters brought by EU civil servants 
concern far less complex matters than those in matters like merger control, 
competition, state aid, anti-dumping, etc., while all of the latter are 
considerably more important in terms of amounts in dispute, economic impact, 
etc.  
Against this background, the civil servants of the EU are better treated in terms 
of length of time-limit for bringing a complaint before the court with no 
objective justification for such preferential treatment. It would thus be 
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appropriate to provide a time limit of three months for all actions for 
annulment, regardless of the status of the applicant.  
In my view, this issue is not solely a legal one. It is also an important issue of 
public perception. Addressing the imbalance of time limits provides an 
opportunity for the EU legislator to contribute to a higher degree of equality in 
proceedings before the EU Courts.  
This would be similar to an earlier legislative amendment which abolished a 
privilege granted to EU civil servants as part of their special status regarding 
the costs of the proceedings, which meant that they if they lost the case they 
would, as a rule, only bear their own costs, while anybody else would, if 
defeated, also have to pay the other party’s costs.  
 
Eight theme: Judicial costs 
Proceedings before the EU courts are “free of charge, except where a party has 
caused the judicial body concerned to incur “avoidable costs” or where 
“copying or translation work is carried out”61.  
This rule raises a number of questions:  
First, the absence of court costs dates back to the days when the ECJ was the 
only judicial instance of the EU. The reason for this generous exemption may 
have been that no one should be deterred from pursuing any action at the ECJ 
and that the obligation to be represented by a lawyer is costly enough, 
depending upon the Member State.  
In the meantime, however, the number of judicial instances has increased from 
one to three, and the number of cases has risen sharply. The amounts in 
dispute, in particular at the GC, have reached record-breaking highs. In the past 
ten to fifteen years it is not uncommon for the total amount of fines in 
competition cases to reach several hundred million €, and in some instances 
well over one billion €62 . These cases, as well as those regarding merger 
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control and misuse of dominant positions, tend to be complex and often 
involve many interveners. As a result, some oral hearings may take several 
days. Moreover, the length of certain written judgments illustrates the amount 
of work generated by such complex cases. For instance, the judgment in the 
Intel-case comprised 296 pages. In Joined Cases T-25/95 et al, Cimenteries 
CBR a.o. v. Commission, it reached a historic 1.400 pages.  
Yet applicants to the GC do not pay any court costs, since currently all costs of 
the EU courts, which were €334 million in 2011, come out of the EU budget, 
meaning that ultimately the EU taxpayer pays. Thus, after having suffered the 
hugely detrimental economic effects of e.g. price-fixing, market partitions, and 
other hard core anti-trust behavior, every European citizen still had to pay all 
court costs in e.g. Case T-541/08, by which Sosal, the world’s largest producer 
of coal-based petrol, managed to reduce the fine imposed by the European 
Commission from €318 million to €150 million after a court case which took 
six years. This total exemption from court costs applies even when, after years 
of proceedings at first instance, an unhappy company appeals the judgment to 
the ECJ.  
This is in contrast to the rules on court costs existing, e.g., at the UK Supreme 
Court
63
. Why should this fundamentally differ at the judicial instances of the 
EU? This question arises even more for those applicants who do not pay any 
corporate or other taxes in the EU. This issue, which I raised in my 
Commentary
64
, has at last been taken up by MEP Lehne (Kinsella, Duke, 
2013). In my Commentary I could not possibly extend this discussion to further 
aspects, with which I will now deal. Here I will reflect on a mechanism that 
would ensure that EU citizens’ interests are better taken into account when 
adopting ECJ rules of procedure:  
So far, the legislative process for the adoption of the rules of procedure only 
involves the ECJ and the Council of the EU, unlike the “normal” legislative 
process for the adoption of Directives and Regulations, which includes the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council. The ECJ is likely to 
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define any amendment according to its own interest, which is essentially to 
ensure that the proceedings are dealt with as swiftly and effectively as possible, 
while still complying with various general principles of law.  
Thus, it would seem that there is no particular incentive within the ECJ to 
make paying court costs a general rule, since this is primarily a political issue. 
In theory, the Council, which votes on the EU budget, should be more 
receptive towards this issue. This leads to the more fundamental question of 
who is looking after the interests of the European citizens in the context of the 
rules of procedure.  
I do not suggest involving the European Parliament in the legislative process, 
given the very technical nature of the rules of procedure. But this is all the 
more a reason to require the ECJ to carry out an “impact assessment” of the 
rules of procedure on the interests of the citizens and to take account of the 
results when making a proposal to the Council. After all, the European 
Commission carries out an “impact assessment” in the context of the 
“classical” legislative process. 
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SECTION 4 
Limitations and constructive feedback 
______________________________________________________ 
From my perspective 
Drawbacks of being a single author 
My choice to be a single author (see Section 2 above) came at the price of 
having to comment upon certain provisions even though other authors were 
likely to be better placed to do so. For instance, the provisions governing the 
“internal sphere” of the three Courts are a typical subject for insiders, e.g. 
“référendaires.” But “référendaires” have busy schedules and are thus rarely 
available. In addition, as temporary agents of the Court they need to inform 
their employer beforehand of any publishing project
65
 and there may be 
objections. I also assumed that Judges might be reluctant to contribute to a 
Commentary on procedural rules edited by a lawyer, as they might prefer to see 
their name come first, the role of a lawyer being limited to that of a possible 
co-author in their minds. But then again, admittedly, I was not very tempted to 
test my assumption as this would have taken considerable time while there was 
an urgency to get the project done. I also convinced myself that the provisions 
governing the internal functioning of the Courts would not be of primary 
interest to the main target group, i.e. the practitioners. This was certainly true 
to some extent, but also somewhat presumptuous, since the judiciary was also 
part of my target audience (see Section 2 above).  
At this stage, with the urgency gone, I am now considering changing my initial 
approach and inviting insiders of the ECJ to provide commentary on more 
institutional provisions, once the forthcoming second edition of the 
Commentary materializes. Assuming I have my publisher’s approval, this 
edition will appear once the Council adopts the GC’s pending proposal 
regarding its rules of procedure.  
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I have deliberately renounced the idea of adding a foreword by someone with 
an elevated status in the profession to lend credibility to my work by 
explaining the importance and legitimacy of my Commentary. This was not 
because I am someone who only trusts his or her own writing. Rather, I see a 
foreword as a form of recognition of true, rather than perceived, merit of a 
particular work. Thus, it is more appropriate for the second edition of the 
Commentary to have a foreword. The second edition of my German 
commentary, which is due to be published in early 2016, will provide me with 
such an opportunity.  
While spending four years writing the Commentary, preceded by another four 
years spent on the German book, was undoubtedly beneficial in terms of 
learning, I also became aware that I risked spotting procedural issues 
everywhere, yet another aspect of the “tunnel view” (see Section 2) I am eager 
to avoid.  
Finally, my apprehension that I might in the end grow tired of this subject, 
which is also part of my daily practice, did not materialize, fortunately, despite 
a clear degree of fatigue. When my publisher contacted me recently about 
publishing a second edition of my German commentary, I was probably as 
enthusiastic as when I published my first legal article, some 20 years ago. 
 
Critical reviews by academics and Judges 
I see book reviews (Appendix 7) as an important source of further learning. In 
her succinct review, a German national Judge by the name of Maria Lena Lux, 
notes that the Commentary reflects the substantial forensic expertise of the 
author and that its readability is enhanced by the abundant use of footnotes. 
The latter is also emphasized by Picod in his review (see below).  
In his book review Carrick finds that “A notable and disappointing, omission 
from this analysis is a presentation of the Rules of Procedure of the European 
Union Civil Service Tribunal.” I am tempted to reply: yes and no. The merit of 
this comment depends upon what the reviewer means: Commenting upon each 
and every article of the rules of procedure of the CST would have been clearly 
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disproportionate. There was no objective need for it, since about 90 % of the 
rules of procedure of the CST are identical to those of the GC. Also, this would 
have very substantially increased the number of pages, as Picod rightly points 
out, and thus the price of the book. In addition, practitioner demand for CST 
rule commentary is very limited. This is a niche area practiced by some fifty to 
one hundred lawyers in the EU, if at all, with French as the predominant 
language of the proceedings. I thus decided that while commenting upon the 
rules of procedure of the GC, I would integrate specific chapters whenever the 
RP of the CST differed from those of the GC.  
That said, Carrick’s critique gave me the idea of adding a table that lists the 
major differences between the RP CST and the RP GC. I will do so in the 
forthcoming second edition of my German commentary and for the second 
edition of my English book at a later stage - provided that the CST has not been 
abolished by then (see Section 3 above).  
Carrick also points out that the Commentary is “quite superficial” on some 
matters, such as in relation to the “forthcoming increase of the number of 
Judges in the GC” (see Section 3 above), while adding that “it is not in the 
nature of a project such as this to lean on the side of holistic analytical rigor.”  
From my perspective, the issue of the GC Judges is not an ideal example for 
making such statement. My commentary aims at “a holistic approach to issues 
relating to proceedings” before the EU courts, as Augustyniak rightly notes in 
his rather detailed book review. The issue of the number of Judges is 
undoubtedly an interesting subject, but it is an institutional matter, which is not 
a procedural rule proper and has only a very indirect bearing on the daily 
judicial proceedings. I nevertheless addressed it and also reflected on 
alternatives for the sake of completeness. But it would have been outside the 
subject and reader demand to embark onto an in depth analysis of this subject, 
as interesting as it is.  
My preceding comment applies a fortiori to Augustyniak’s view that I should 
have covered the provisions governing the Commission’s infringement 
procedure against Member States. This would have broadened the subject 
beyond the procedural issues. But I will take Augustyniak’s point up to explore 
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with my publisher whether it would be of interest to broaden the subject of the 
Commentary so as to cover the provisions in the TFEU and the TEU laying 
down the foundations of the EU judicial system. 
While this example is, as such, of very little importance, it does in my view 
illustrate something more fundamental, i.e. that publishing is also about the 
author’s ability to put many different factors- such as choosing and addressing 
the subjects according to the readers’ demand, the time factor, economic 
constraints, such as production costs and the selling price, etc.- into the “right” 
equation - bearing in mind that any re-edition of the book also provides the 
opportunity of reviewing the balance struck.  
Carrick concludes that “such a project is quite original and long overdue given 
the demonstrable neglect of the CJEU’s rules of procedure within academic 
literature. As such, this book presents, at the very least, a platform for further 
research, as well as a useful resource for scholars and practitioners alike”. 
For a first edition this probably means: Mission accomplished.  
In his book review, Picod stresses inter alia the added value of the various 
tables and statistics I have inserted into my Commentary with respect to e.g. 
the taxation of costs or legal aid. This is a welcome echo coming from a 
scholar regarding information that is primarily useful to practitioners. But 
Picod is also perfectly right in finding that a general bibliography is missing. It 
is true that this would indeed provide a useful overview on the various 
monographs and legal publications I refer to in the footnotes. This would be 
particularly useful for scholars and will be added to the second edition.  
The Dutch “Tijdssschrift voor Europees en economisch recht” accurately 
remarked that my Commentary is concise, matter-of-fact, and also sometimes 
more personal
66
. The latter seems to allude to, amongst other things, the views 
I express in the preface. More importantly, this review reminds me that the 
concept of an article-by-article Commentary is much broader than that of a 
purely academic perspective, focused on theory and observation, with respect 
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to a given subject. At the same time, academia benefits from the Commentary, 
as Carrick rightly concludes. 
 
Critique by “the market”? 
In the case of e.g. a novel, the number of copies sold is normally evidence of a 
positive review, in particular if it becomes a bestseller. The circumstances 
regarding a legal book, however, are substantially different. The decision to 
buy such a publication is not, as such, an expression of positive or indeed any 
other form of critique. For instance, university libraries select their resources 
according to a variety of criteria, such as the relevance to the curriculum; 
demand for the subject matter; uniqueness of the title or presentation of 
information; cost/benefit analysis; its value for both university and professional 
research; and an assessment of how students and other stakeholders rate its 
accessibility and practical value. 
A further indicator, which I see as reliable or more so than any book review, is 
to date, as already pointed out in Section 2 above, the Library of the ECJ has 
purchased a total of fifteen copies, eight of which are “permanently borrowed” 
by cabinets of Judges at the ECJ. This is in addition to the seven copies of the 
German commentary on permanent loan (Appendix 5).  
In their judgments, the ECJ and the other judicial instances never refer to legal 
publications. This may be due to a variety of reasons, one being French legal 
tradition, which itself reflects views that law is a science. Citing legal 
scholarship would undermine the ‘majesty’ and ‘authority’ of judicial rulings 
by suggesting that there could be more than one answer per legal question or 
that there is room for interpretation or discussion. From the ECJ’s perspective, 
it may be necessary to see things in this way, but one should not forget that e.g. 
in Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, 
commonly refer to scholarly books, including my German commentary
67
. This 
seems to indicate that there are different schools of thought when it comes to 
being worried about the authority of judgments being undermined.  
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There may be another, more EU specific reason, i.e. that it may be politically 
delicate to quote authors, bearing in mind that in certain Member States of the 
EU, authors of EU publications are much more productive than in others. By 
contrast, it does happen, albeit very rarely, that the EU Courts express their 
views as to the quality of an agent’s or lawyer’s arguments or work in a more 
eloquent manner than simply sharing a lawyer’s views68:  
In the aforementioned referral proceedings in Case Haïm
69
, an important case 
on liability of the Member States in which eight parties, including the 
Commission, which I represented, gave their views on the preliminary 
questions, (see Section 2 above), Advocate-General Léger held: “It was the 
Commission which set out, most clearly and most exhaustively, the evidence to 
this effect, and I can but repeat its line of arguments…”. The remainder of the 
Opinion reads accordingly.  
In Case Kschwendt v Commission,
70
 which I pleaded for the defendant, the then 
Court of First Instance of the EU
71
 held: “The interested party [the applicant] 
did not even attempt to criticize the validity of the numerous quantified, precise 
and concordant elements collected by the services of the Commission, at the 
price of a considerable amount of work…” 72 . What the Judges could not 
possibly express is that the work was carried out by the external lawyer to 
whom the Commission had outsourced this case.  
 
What the Commentary cannot achieve  
In the course of my litigation practice I often note to what a surprising extent 
many litigators disregard certain obvious procedural rules. For instance, while 
appeals against decisions at first instance are limited to points of law 
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(Wägenbaur, 1995; idem, 2003) many appellants will nevertheless e.g. contest 
facts or sometimes even attempt to change the subject matter of the 
proceedings at first instance. It is also manifestly mistaken to lodge an appeal 
drafted in a language other than the one chosen at first instance
73
. While this is 
sometimes due to the ignorance of some lawyers
74
, it appears to be deliberate 
in the case of some of their more experienced colleagues. If appellants were to 
rigorously comply with all rules governing the admissibility of an appeal, they 
might quickly realize they have either little or nothing to validate an appeal. In 
the end, this reflects the fact that there is an automatic right to appeal, meaning 
that there is no requirement to apply for permission to appeal, unlike in the UK. 
Nor are there any Court costs to be paid by the appellant. These are subjects 
which lend themselves to being further explored. 
Staff cases are another sector where determination and sometimes-retaliatory 
desperation guides certain applicants, thus becoming a fertile source of case 
law regarding procedural questions. For instance, a former Commission official 
who has become a notorious ECJ applicant, has the unique record of 210 
procedures before the three EU courts. In March 2014, this former official’s 
lawyer has been excluded from five contentious cases for interfering with the 
good administration of justice
75
, the first case of exclusion in EU history. The 
applicant’s new lawyer did not learn the lesson, however; he was excluded in 
December 2014
76
.  
The above example and similar cases e.g. in which a lawyer persistently 
refused to reduce the extraordinary number of pages of their written 
submissions to the GC rule
77
, illustrate that it is indeed time to reflect on a 
common ethical standard for Counsel before the European Court of Justice, 
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which is what Sarvarian has undertaken in an article published in 2012. 
Sarvarian examines “the considerable problems in practice arising from 
questionable professional conduct by representatives” and notes that “the 
absence of a prescribed code of conduct setting out the Courts’ precise standard 
for representatives is a threat to the Court’s procedural integrity and 
legitimacy” (Sarvarian, 2012: 991). I cannot but fully subscribe to his proposal 
that the national Law societies should “draft a code of conduct for the 
European Courts, which could ultimately be adopted by the national Courts and 
integrated into national codes of conduct” (Sarvarian, 2012: 991). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
78 
 
 
SECTION 5 
Critical reflections on some of the unexpected issues that arose 
while undertaking such a critique and their significance 
______________________________________________________ 
Is success pre-determined or a form of personal merit?  
I expected that writing this context statement would primarily require an 
innovative reflection on my Commentary, which in turn would imply taking 
some distance from my work, rather than reflecting on e.g. my professional 
path. But describing my personal positioning in Section 1 gently forced me into 
contemplating the evolution of my professional life thus far, and as part of this 
process, asking myself questions I had never really thought about, in particular, 
whether I had any “merit”.  
All I really knew for sure is that e.g. my bi-national background, having been 
raised in another country, and enjoying the extraordinary privilege of having 
been born into a period of peace, were amongst those circumstances, which 
have certainly helped but have nothing to do with any form of merit as 
commonly defined.  
But is this also true for all the steps which, when taken together, may be called 
“professional success”? In other words, is success predetermined, meaning that 
there is nothing I can do about it, or is it the result of actions we determine 
autonomously, in which case there would be room for personal merit? 
Similarly, is leadership innate or learned (Chase, 2010)? 
Here I was contemplating questions that are as old as they are complex and 
which many philosophers from various cultures have dealt with extensively. I 
was raised with what is probably a typically Western belief, i.e. that while no 
one chooses genetics, sociology, upbringing, talents, and other purely 
circumstantial factors, one important factor leading to success - apart from 
what we like to call “luck”- is how and to which extent the individual actually 
uses these circumstances in a success-focused manner. 
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But this does not answer the question of whether deploying such efforts is the 
result of an autonomously taken decision or whether it is predetermined, the 
individual having thus no choice other than making result-oriented efforts.  
I quickly renounced any attempt to reflect in any deeper way on these 
questions. Scarce time was less of a reason than my persistent impression that 
humans are not meant to find the answer to this question and many others. This 
impression may reflect an opportunistic approach, i.e. because I want to believe 
and remain convinced that an autonomously-determined effort produces 
success and thus merit, a convenient view after all. What I can say is that 
meeting the limits of one’s horizon is nothing unexpected. While often 
frustrating, encountering one’s limits may actually, in this respect, be 
reassuring.  
 
A tunnel with … a view  
From an early stage I sensed that any professional, no matter his activity, risks 
acquiring a “tunnel view”, meaning that he would have little if no time to 
access or understand other areas of his profession. Worse, those with tunnel 
view would rapidly be unable to venture into any other discipline, even if only 
superficially. This seems a high price for specialising in one subject.  
That said, gradually discovering the particular diversity of my activity as a 
litigation lawyer in EU law with all its legal, philological, strategic, and 
political aspects led me to believe that this would, to some extent at least, 
prevent any “tunnel view.” As a further prophylactic remedy I began 
publishing legal articles on subjects as diverse as possible. Apart from covering 
procedural subjects, I explored more remote issues such as combating money-
laundering, the shortcomings of the Schengen-Agreement, the preamble of the 
draft European Constitution, on European values, the difficult cohabitation 
between the internal market and health protection, etc. (Appendix 2).  
I am convinced that what at first appears to be non-focused publishing activity 
has actually had a cross-fertilizing effect and, even more importantly, provides 
me with a number of short sabbatical breaks from my professional activity. 
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That said, while progressing through the context statement I was disillusioned 
by my hitherto firm conviction that a “non-legal” discipline could hardly ever 
provide a meaningful contribution to discussing such an eminently legal - and 
arid - subject as the procedural rules of the EU judiciary. This was a possible 
consequence of a formatted mind-set, since adopting a non-legal approach in 
my professional activity would, in all likelihood, be perceived as 
unprofessional or showing a lack of legal arguments. I now know that there is 
room for the coexistence of both openness to other disciplines and practising as 
a lawyer. The challenge is to strike the right balance. For instance, while 
writing the context statement, it occurred to me that it would be helpful to 
create a didactic form, which national Judges may use for referring requests for 
a preliminary ruling to the ECJ in order to curb the number of referrals that are 
rejected as inadmissible (see Section 3).  
 
Trapped by the concept of the Commentary? 
While doing research on the origin of the concept of an article-by-article 
Commentary for Section 2 the last thing I expected was to come across 
publications that question the merits of the concept of a commentary and, what 
is worse, in a most interesting way. The author (Henne, 2006) explains in 
essence that, firstly, article-by-article commentaries have a streamlining effect 
on legal thinking, leaving little or no room for taking account of historical, 
philosophical, and comparative aspects. Thus, secondly, commentaries are 
detrimental to monographs, the classical form of communication used by the 
academic world, and thereby tend to make practice prevail over academia. 
Thirdly, the authors of commentaries tend to be “rainmakers,” since they 
effectively who decide who of the authors on a given subject are part of the 
“main stream” line of thinking and who not.  
 
I came to the conclusion that while all of this may true with respect to German 
commentaries inside the national context, this does not ipso facto apply to my 
Commentary, which is used by persons from diverse legal backgrounds.  On 
the contrary, not only did I take historical and comparative arguments into 
account whenever possible, but I used legal publications for the purpose of 
enriching the discussion, and not dividing them into categories. That said, I see 
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the thoughts expressed by Henne as a most useful contribution to be kept in 
mind for the purpose of a future second edition of my book.  
Educating citizens or cultivating ignorance?  
While working on Section 3 of the context statement I could not avoid a 
slightly surreal impression: Here I was in the midst of reflecting on a fresh take 
on various procedural issues, while quite a number of the five hundred million 
EU citizens can’t even tell the difference between the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg and the ECJ in Luxembourg. Thus, I was 
prompted into reflecting on the impact that the general knowledge (or lack 
thereof) of the citizens of the twenty -eight Member States is likely to have on 
EU matters. By the same token, it became very clear to me that while my 
Commentary may well be a major work, this is only true for a comparatively 
small number of citizens, who tend to have above-average knowledge of the 
EU anyway.  
The findings of the “Eurobarometer,” the EU’s polling arm 78 , and other 
sources (e.g. Norrie, 2014) converge towards the same conclusion: more than 
sixty years after the signing of the European Treaty on Coal and Steel, the 
average citizen still has a fairly limited general knowledge of the EU, although  
many are familiar with iconic keywords such as “internal market”, “Schengen”, 
the “Euro”, etc. But many citizens have a very limited knowledge of certain 
EU subjects. This is likely due to the manner in which the subject is presented 
or commented on by the media, politicians, and social networks such as 
neighbours and friends. To a large extent this is not surprising, since many 
citizens do not have much knowledge of the institutional functioning of their 
own country either, a sphere which should be less remote from one’s everyday 
life.   
But this is not a reason for leaving the level of knowledge on the EU as it is, 
i.e. rather low. The idea is of course not to “bombard” EU citizens with as 
much relevant information as possible. This would be naïve, if not arrogant, 
ineffective, and ultimately counterproductive. Providing information about the 
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EU should focus primarily on subjects likely to matter to the individual in his 
daily life, such as the various fundamental and economic rights EU-law 
guarantees to the individual. Also, everyone should be aware that the process 
of European unification provided us with e.g. a continuous period of seventy 
years of peace in Europe. Admittedly, this may be a more pertinent subject on 
the Continent than in the British Isles. The message is not one of uncritical 
adoration of the EU, far from it, but rather one of being more aware of some of 
its achievements instead of taking things for granted – which I would call a 
silent disease in our part of the world. Moreover, this helps the individual to 
e.g. put the views expressed by politicians and the media into a broader context 
while acquiring the minimum knowledge any democratic participation 
requires, e.g. through elections to the European Parliament. This leads to the 
question of who in Europe is responsible for improving general knowledge of 
the EU and the role of the Member States in this activity? In 2008, the 
European Union spent 2,4 billion euros promoting itself by distributing 
classical promotional material, such as booklets, films, open-door days, and 
funding of NGO’s, think tanks and lobby groups which support and promote 
the EU’s objectives (Rotherham/Mullally, 2008). Critics argue that the 
European Institution on the whole proved an “unsuitable vehicle for informing 
the people on what the EU is doing” (Rotherham/Mullally, 2008). This is a 
complex subject begging for a cost-benefit analysis to be carried out by an 
external body e.g. a consultant.  
Some Member States - much more than others - undertake initiatives to provide 
information about the EU, such as adapting their governmental websites, 
leading topical campaigns, events, co-operating with NGOs, etc. Again, the 
question of a cost-benefit analysis arises. Perhaps a less obvious but common 
sense idea would be to not only insert this education into school curricula, but 
to consistently develop it over the time it takes for a child to mature to work or 
higher education level.  Teaching pupils about the EU is part of the school 
curriculum in e.g.  France
79
, Ireland
80
 and Germany
81
. In the UK (Saviddes, 
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2003), it appears that a new geography curriculum, published in February 
2013, “makes no reference to the economic and political union” (Paton, 2013). 
In my view, in order to gain insight into the supra- and international sphere one 
must first understand the basics of the State and its institutions. Once this 
insight has been acquired, pupils should gradually discover the fundamentals of 
European integration, which include the reasons why the European community 
has been founded and its achievement in terms of peacekeeping, common 
values and guaranteeing a variety of economic and fundamental rights to all 
citizens. As with any other subject, though, there should not be any 
indoctrination of a particular view. Teaching about the EU should indeed be 
neutral and balanced (Rotherham/Mullally, 2008).  
It is also important for pupils to learn to critically discuss EU issues, e.g. the 
merits and limits of a further geographical enlargement of the EU.  
Ultimately, it is less a matter of whether the individual adheres partly, fully or 
even not at all to the concept of European integration than  that every pupil is 
given a chance to acquire at least a basic knowledge of European integration 
and to learn to reflect on it, before reaching any conclusions.  
Such a pedagogical approach is certainly not specific to the subject of the EU: 
any Western democracy implies an active participation of its citizens and thus 
needs to teach and guide its pupils towards becoming active and responsible 
members of society. This requires, amongst many other aspects, a sufficient 
knowledge of how society works and learning to think critically. The ultimate 
challenge for all EU citizens is to find the right balance between their national 
identity and sense of belonging and those subjects that lend themselves to be 
achieved in common. We should never forget that a supra-national level cannot 
exist without a national level, whilst the opposite may well exist.  
 
My understanding of professional leadership in the context of publishing 
My ambition of being the first author to publish an English-language, article-
by-article Commentary on the procedural rules of the EU judiciary was also 
functional, since it provided me with much of the energy I needed to persevere 
84 
 
throughout four years of writing. Undertaking the present context statement 
triggered a change in perception. Reflecting on whether the Commentary is a 
major work (see Section 3) is not just about assessing the various book reviews 
while waiting for the opportunity of a future second edition. It is, at this stage, 
about realizing that my Commentary is truly a major work only if measured 
against a competing Commentary.  
The situation is similar to the one of a single bidder in a public procurement 
procedure, which was the subject of a referral case I had pleaded for the 
European Commission at the ECJ many years ago
82. The bidder’s submission 
was refused even though he fulfilled all the technical criteria, because 
determining whether a bidder is value for money is a matter of comparison, 
which did not exist in that particular case.  
I have thus realized that my Commentary is not the leading publication merely 
because it happens to remain for a relatively long period of time the only 
publication of its kind on the market. In the end, only comparing it with at least 
one directly competing publication will reveal the level of value or merit of my 
Commentary. Thus, I now welcome the idea that other authors might, one day, 
publish a competing Commentary, rather than hoping to stay as the only 
remaining publication in this area, as this would ultimately be a self-defeating 
position.   
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SECTION 6 
Intentional directions 
______________________________________________________ 
Further publishing revisited  
Many of my colleagues taking part in a doctoral program tend to adopt a 
functional approach: it serves the purpose of obtaining a title and their PhD 
thesis will thus remain, in many instances, their first and last publication ever. 
In my case, it is the other way round, as I regularly published prior to this 
doctoral programme and will go on doing so in the future.  
As to next steps, I will be working on the second edition of my German 
commentary and, at a later stage, of my English Commentary. The GC’s 
legislative proposal of March 2014 contains an additional one hundred articles, 
similar in number to and yet different from the ECJ’s recent recast of its own 
rules of procedure. It is safe to assume that the said proposal will be adopted 
and come into force in 2015.  
I have little doubt that the present doctoral program will influence the way in 
which I will reflect on these arguments and possibly also the spirit of future 
publications. In the world of publications on EU subjects, in particular with 
respect to judicial themes, there is probably not a broad margin for thoughts 
derived from other disciplines, except perhaps for some historical and political 
arguments. But the present program has opened new horizons and this will 
undoubtedly accompany me when undertaking future publishing. 
Teaching 
The completion of the doctorate will become the starting point of a project 
which I have had for a number of years now, but which the work on the 
successive commentaries kept relegating to a lower position on the priority list.  
For many years now EU law has been part of the curriculum of quite a number 
of law faculties and institutes. Courses and lectures usually cover all the main 
areas of EU law, such as the four fundamental freedoms and competition law, 
but also more specific areas, such as fundamental rights and environmental and 
86 
 
social law. The curriculum of my LLM program in EU law covered “legal 
remedies,” which is an important part of the EU judicial system. There is of 
course no objective justification, nor presumably any tangible demand, for 
lectures that would focus on the full spectrum of litigation at the EU courts, 
both from a theoretical and practical perspective. This ‘no objective 
justification for’ view is obvious for the undergraduate level, and certainly also 
true for post-graduate programs. In addition, from a personal perspective, being 
a regular lecturer would hardly be compatible with my professional constraints.  
That said, considering whether there is room for e.g. a seminar or a colloquium 
series for postgraduate students with a special interest in litigation at the EU 
courts deserves to be explored. This may be the case provided that such a 
course would cover a much broader, if not the full spectrum of instruments that 
are at the disposal of individuals or companies for defending their interests vis-
à-vis the EU, since litigation is merely the ultima ratio of conflict resolution. 
These other instruments provide important opportunities and yet remain little 
known:  
Firstly, EU law
83
 guarantees the public the right to gain access to EU 
documents, which serves the purpose of transparency. Access to EU documents 
may be vital for litigation or for defending individual economic or political 
interests vis-à-vis EU institutions or a Member State. But it may also be a 
precious source of information for NGOs, journalists, and doctoral students. 
The GC’s abundant case law illustrates both the variety of individuals and 
organizations for which the issue of public access is potentially relevant and 
the complexity of drawing exact lines between the principle of access and the 
various exceptions to this principle provided in Regulation 1049/2001 
(Wägenbaur, 2001). This issue is further complicated by the fact that some 
institutions, such as the ECB, have their own rules on public access, which 
became relevant in a Court case I pleaded for the ECB itself
84
.  
Secondly, every citizen has the right to complain to the European Commission 
about a Member State infringing EU law through national legislation and/or 
                                                          
83
 Article 15 TFEU and its implementation by Council Regulation no. 1049/2001 
84
 Case F-26/12, Cerafogli v ECB [2014], currently under appeal  
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administrative practice. The plaintiff may use an optional complaint form to be 
found on the Commission’s website. There is also no legal obligation to be 
represented by a lawyer, which means that the complaint may be brief. As a 
result, the Commission will ideally initiate infringement proceedings against 
the Member State concerned and, in case of persistent infringement of EU law, 
take that Member State to Court. Should the ECJ find that the Member State 
did breach EU law, and additionally finds that this breach is grave, the 
plaintiffs who suffered a prejudice may then claim damages from that Member 
State in proceedings before a national Court.  
Thirdly, a further tool any individual may use without having to embark on any 
particular and potentially costly procedure is to convince a member of the 
European Parliament to submit a written question to the European Commission 
on any given EU matter. This instrument is another important means of fact 
finding at the disposal of a broad variety of individuals and organizations and 
can prove to be a very efficient alternative to litigation, as illustrated by my 
personal experience, many years ago:  
The French subsidiary of a multinational company claimed refund of a very 
substantial amount of VAT that it had paid over several years for advertising 
services. The French fiscal authorities flatly refused this refund. The company 
took the State to Court, knowing that these proceedings were bound to take 
years and that the outcome would be uncertain. The parent company’s finance 
director then called me to first let me know what he thought of lawyers in 
general – and I must say he was quite right – and then to simply say: “Do 
something with the Commission.” And so I did. I rather quickly managed to 
convince a member of the European Parliament that the French court 
proceedings included a question concerning the term “fiscal unit” as defined by 
the sixth VAT Directive of the EU. I persuaded this parliamentarian that this 
question was of general interest and thus deserved to be submitted to the 
European Commission. The Commission’s written reply was exactly what I 
had been hoping for and provided the basis for making it very clear to the 
French fiscal authorities that any further refusal of refund was putting France at 
a clear risk of infringement proceedings by the Commission. After some 
months of complete silence my client received a simple letter from the said 
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fiscal authorities merely indicating the words “restitution d’office” (ex officio 
reimbursement), and the amount, i.e. a seven-digit figure, with no further 
explanation. Compared to a court case my input was relatively small, but the 
result was significant and expedited quickly or ‘was big and came fast’, in the 
words of the company’s finance director.  
Fourthly, EU citizens have the right to complain to the European Ombudsman 
in case of maladministration by an EU institution, and to OLAF, the EU’s 
financial watchdog, against any individual or company involved in fraud or to 
report other financial irregularities which harm the EU budget. In my view, 
these various instruments, when considered along with judicial protection at 
the EU courts, lend themselves as a subject for a seminar for students since 
they illustrate that EU citizens have many remedies available than just 
litigation.  
Good teaching is fundamentally the art of distilling and translating information 
without bias, to see understanding not as something arrived at through process 
but by creating the conditions for understanding to take place (Bruns, 1992). 
This translates very well the spirit which I believe to have applied or 
transposed to my work so far, be it as a litigator, as an author of publications or 
as a guest speaker, e.g. at the 58
th
 Annual National Conference of German 
Lawyers in 2007.  
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SECTION 7  
Concluding remarks 
________________________________________ 
The overall purpose of this context statement, i.e. to critically assess my own 
public works, has been a challenging and unique experience for me. I may have 
contemplated the idea from time to time but always managed to ignore 
standing back and looking at my own outputs from a range of perspectives. 
This might have been a symptom of how anyone can be caught up in a tunnel 
view, although I remain convinced that I am only a mild case.  
This context statement has highlighted the value of reflecting on the role of 
non-legal arguments drawn from other disciplines when discussing legal 
aspects. I would actually say that I would never again be able to see legal 
issues from a purely legal perspective. This has renewed my respect for the 
opinions of others that are not criticism but critique that can help to develop 
arguments and ignite new thinking and creativity leading to new projects. Such 
critiques add to my box of motivational tools that, as I have stated earlier, 
include attitude and commitment to cultural openness and ongoing learning.  
In contrast to other types of publications, a context statement is unlikely to be a 
recurrent exercise. This is regrettable in a way, as it is such a non-conventional 
experience. But the mind-broadening effect of the context statement will 
certainly accompany me throughout my professional and personal life. 
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